KUNWAR RANI Vs. COMMISSIONER OF URBAN LAND CEILINGS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition is directed against the order of the Commissioner of Land Reforms and Urban Land Ceilings, dated 28-1 -1994, by which the appeal against the proceedings dated 2-12-1993 of the Competent Authority under Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short the Act'), was dismissed. The admitted facts are that a draft statement under Section 8 of the Act was issued on 7-8-1991 granting thirty days time to the petitioner to make her objections. Admittedly, no objections were filed within that period of time. The matter was posted for enquiry on 26-10-1991, and in the absence of the petitioner it was adjourned to 30-11-1991. Thereafter, it has been adjourned from time to time either because the officer was not available or was busy. On 9-7-1992 the offfcer was transferred and the case was posted to 7-9-1992. The advocate appeared on that date and sought time for filing objections. The new officer took the view that since no objections have been filed within the stipulated time of thirty days, no further hearing was required and closed the case. The petitioner thereupon filed the appeal to the Commissioner of Land Reforms. He held, by order dated 28-1-1994, that Section 8(4) does not contemplate consideration of objections beyond the stipulated period unless the said period is extended by the Special Officer, and in the present case since there was no extension of time, the contention of the petitioner could not be entertained.

(2.) IN this writ petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the petitioner was represented by the advocate and sought adjournment from time to time, it must be recognised that the special officer had, by necessary implication, granted extension of time. My attention was drawn to the meaning of the word adjourned' in the Law Lexicon to the effect that it is also used in its popular sense i.e. "deferring or postponing an inquiry to a future day". It was submitted that since the enquiry had been fixed even after the date for filing the objections had expired, it meant that the time for filing the objections had been extended to the date of enquiry, or in the alternative that the enquiry will be held even without the objections, on the analogy of Order IX Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the other hand, the respondents have filed a counter affidavit to contend that the provisions of Section 8 does not require any enquiry if no objections are filed within the stipulated time and therefore, the authorities below were right in refusing to entertain any further request from the petitioner. The provisions of Section 8 (4) is as follows: "Section 8 (4): The competent authority shall duly consider any objection received, within the period specified in the notice referred to in sub-section (3) or until such further period as may be specified by the competent authority for any good and sufficient reason, from the person on whom a copy of the draft statement has been served under that sub-section and the Competent authority shall, after giving objector a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass such orders as it deems fit". Clearly, it contemplates the power to extend the time prescribed under sub-section (3). The only question that survives is whether there was an express or implied extension of time when the enquiry was adjourned from time to time. No doubt, the petitioner had not made a specific application for extension of time. But, when the notice to hold the enquiry had been issued even after the period of thirty days had expired, that necessarily implies that the petitioner will be heard with reference to the draft statement and in common parlance the adjournment of that enquiry would include the deferment of the proceedings of that date viz., the hearing of the petitioner's objections to the draft statement. On the basis of the department's own stand that no enquiry is contemplated when objection is not filed, it would be logical to conclude that if the matter is set down for enquiry, it necessarily implies that time for filing objections had been extended. It is to be noticed that if the enquiry is independent of the objections, as on the analogy of Order IX Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioner is entitled to be heard at the time of enquiry with reference to any lacuna in the draft statement which can be pointed out by the petitioner. IN the present case, it is stated on behalf of the petitioner that even on a reading of the draft statement it would be apparent that the built-up areas and appurtenant areas have been obviously treated as vacant land. Looking at the sequence of the events viz., that the case was dismissed by a successor officer while the predecessor had been adjourning the matter from time to time, it appears to me that the decision to conclude the case was taken because of change in perception viz., that the succeeding officer thought that no enquiry is required once objections are not filed within the stipulated time, whereas the predecessor officer had been adjourning the case from time to time, presumably, to allow the petitioner to file the objections at a later date. Looking at it from this point of view also, it is apparent that the petitioner had been denied an adequate opportunity to fiie the objections and to represent her case. IN the circumstances deem it fit to quash the orders of both the authorities below, and remit the matter to the special officer with a direction to entertain the objection of the petitioner if filed before 30-11-1994, and to hold an enquiry thereafter and re-decide the issue on merits. Writ petition is disposed off. No costs.