LAWS(APH)-1994-1-5

PARUCHURU NARASIMHA RAO Vs. NUNE PANDU RANGA RAO

Decided On January 21, 1994
PARUCHURU NARASIMHA RAO Appellant
V/S
NUNE PANDU RANGA RAO Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner in these two Civil Revision Petitions was defendant in two suits, namely, O. S. No. 205 of 1988 and O. S. No. 203 of 1988 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Tenali. The suits were filed for recovery of money and decrees were passed on 25-6-1992. The trial court while disposing of the suits scaled-down the interest by applying the provisions of the A. P. (Andhra Area) Agriculturists Relief Act (Act IV of 1938). The interest was awarded at 12% per annum. In the judgments rendered in the suits, a finding was given that the petitioner was an agriculturist within the meaning of S. 3(ii) of Act IV of 1938.

(2.) The respondents-decree-holders filed E. P. for the execution of decrees passed in the aforementioned suits. In the E. Ps. the decree-holder sought for sale of 6 acres of wet land belonging to the petitioner and residential house, which were already attached. The petitioner raised an objection for sale on the ground that the house cannot be attached and sold in view of the bar contained in S. 60(1)(c) of Civil Procedure Code. As far as the agricultural land is concerned, the petitioner contended that his wife was the person interested in the said land. Both these contentions have been overruled and the matter was posted for settlement of terms on 26-7-1993. The petitioner thereupon filed the present C. R. Ps. During the pendency of the C. R. Ps., interim stay was granted on condition of the petitioner depositing half of the decretal amount. Admittedly, the amount has not been deposited.

(3.) The lower Court held that the petitioner cannot claim to be an agriculturist within the meaning of Explanation-V to S. 60(1)(c) of Civil Procedure Code. According to the said definition, the expression 'agriculturist' means a person who cultivates the land personally and who depends for his livelihood mainly on the income from agricultural land whether as owner, tenant, partner or agricultural labourers. The lower Court found that the main avocation of the petitioner is business as he is running a bar-cum-restaurant at Repalle, and he does not, therefore, satisfy the definition of 'agriculturist' for the purpose of claiming the exemption under S.60(1)(c) of Civil Procedure Code. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri G. Dharma Rao, submits that the lower court ignored the crucial fact that in the main judgments in the suits, relief was granted to the petitioner on the footing that he was an agriculturist and the said finding is binding on the respondents. It is submitted that by virtue of operation of the principle of res judicata, the executing court cannot go behind the finding in the judgments and cannot determine afresh in the execution proceedings whether or not the petitioner is an agriculturist. I find myself unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel. The question at issue in the suits and in the E. Ps. cannot be said to be the same or substantially the same. In the suits, the trial court was concerned with the question whether the petitioner-defendant was an 'agriculturist' within the meaning of Act IV of 1938 for the purpose of scaling down the interest. The definition in Act IV of 1938 is not the same as the definition of 'agriculturist' in S. 60(1)(c) of Civil Procedure Code. The tests of personal cultivation and predominant source of income which are laid down in Explanation-V to S. 60(1) of Civil Procedure Code are not there in S. 3(ii) of Act IV of 1938. Thus, different considerations arise in judging the question whether the house owned by the petitioner is exempted from attachment. Viewed from this angle, it cannot be said that the order of the lower court suffers from any illegality. There is another obstacle in the way of the petitioner. It has been laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Ambiah v. A. Mallanna, AIR 1964 Andh Pra 514 that the exemption can be claimed under S. 60 of Civil Procedure Code only in regard to the houses which are occupied for the purpose of cultivating the lands. It was pointed out that there should be nexus between the agricultural implements etc., on one hand the house on the other in order to get the benefit of Clause (c) of S. 60. The mere fact that the judgment-debtor in that case, who owned agricultural lands quite far off from the house, resided in the house and stored grains therein, was held to be not sufficient to claim the benefit of S. 60(1)(c) of Civil Procedure Code. The aforementioned judgment was followed by P. Rama Rao, J. in C. R. P. No. 522 of 1986 (in Ameena Bibi v. Andhra Bank, 1987 (2) ALT(NRC) 13). In the present case, there is no evidence whatsoever to show that there is any connection between the agricultural operations carried on by the petitioner and the house in which he is residing. Thus, viewed from any angle, the petitioner is not entitled to seek immunity from attachment under S.60(1)(c) of Civil Procedure Code in regard to the residential house owned by him. As far as the agricultural land is concerned, the claim that the ownership of land vests with the petitioner's wife has been rejected by the lower Court and the correctness of the said finding has not been canvassed before me.