POCHAIAH Vs. LAKSHMINARASAIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision petition is directed against the order of the Joint Collector, Warangal, in A.No. 23 of 1978, dated 15-11-1979. The petitioners assail the view of the Joint Collector that, under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), no power of review is conferred and consequently the order of the Tahsildar exercising such power of review is illegal. The petitioners filed a petition under Sections 114 and 151 read with Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. before the Tahsildar, Jangaon, requiring him to review the order, dated 13-9-1977 passed by him earlier. The petition for review is filed on the ground that the order, dated 13-9-1977 of the Tahsildar suffered from an error apparent on the face of the record and also on the further ground that certain observations of the Tahsildar in the abovesaid order were not correct. The petition for review was also founded on the further ground that the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction, which was also a mistake apparent on the face of the record. The Tahsildar entertained the review petition and, by his order dt. 24-2-1978, allowed the same, with the result that the original order, dated 13-9-1977 was recalled and the main petition under Section 32 of the Act was allowed. The petitioners filed an appeal before the Joint Collector, Warangal, against the order of the Tahsildar, dated 24-2-1978 reviewing bis earlier order o.n the ground that the Tahsildar has no power of review conferred on him under the Act and, therefore, the order, dated 24-2-1978 reviewing the earlier order, dt. 13-9-77 was without jurisdiction. The Joint Collector, Warangal, allowed the appeal holding that the Tahsildar has no power of review under the Act and, therefore, the order passed by him on 24-2-1978 was without jurisdiction. In this revision petition, the petitioners question the correctness of the view of the Joint Collector that a power of review is not conferred on the Tahsildar under the Act.

(2.) Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the power of review by the Tahsildar is referable to the provisions contained in Section 89 of the Act, inasmuch as the Tahsildar, Tribunal and Collector may exercise all or any of the powers conferred on Civil Courts by the 'Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Learned Counsel contended that, under Section 114 read with Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C., a Civil Court is empowered to exercise power of review and consequently the Tahsildar also can exercise such power. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Radha Bai vs. B. Chinnayya.

(3.) Section 89 of the Act is in the following terms: "89. Procedure and powers at inquiries:(1) The provisions of Sections 149 and 150 of the Land Revenue Act shall apply to the recording of evidence and of decisions at inquiries did under this Act. (2) For the purposes of any such inquiry the Tahsildar, Tribunal and Collector may exercise all or any of the powers conferred on Civil Courts by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 including the power to award costs. It is settled law that power of review cannot be exercised unless it is specifically conferred by the Statute. There is no dispute that the Act does not contain any specific provision conferring power of review on the Tahsildar, Tribunal and Collector. The contention, however, is that the provisions of Section 89 (2) of the Act quoted above, confer such power of review. Section 89 of the Act, as the marginal note itself suggests, deals with the procedure and powers at the inquiries under the Act. Sub-sec. (1) of Section 89 refers to the application of Sections 149 and 150. of the Land Revenue Act in regard to the recording of evidence and of decisions at inquiries held under that Act, Sub-sec. (2) provides that, for the purposes of any such inquiry, the Tahsildar, Tribunal and Collector may exercise all or any of the powers conferred on Civil Courts by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to award costs. In the first blush, it appears that the expression "such inquiry" in sub-section (2) refers to inquiry under Sections 149 and 150 of the Land Revenue Act specified in sub-section (1). If this is the real effect, then it must follow that the powers conferred on Civil Courts by the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be exercised for any purpose other than the inquiry under Sections 149 and 150 of the Land Revenue Act. But then, a reference to Sections 149 and 150 of the Land Revenue Act shows that they contain only the procedure for the purpose of recording of evidence at the inquiries held under the Land Revenue Act. There is no inquiry as such under Section 149 and 150 of the Land Revenue Act and obviously sub-section (1) of Section 89 of the Act merely provides that the procedure specified in Sections 149 and 150 of the Land Revenue Act shall apply to the recording of evidence and of decisions at inquiries .held under the Tenancy Act. This aspect of the matter came up for consideration before the Full Bench of this Court in Radha Bai vs. Chinnayya (supra). Dealing with the contention that Sec. 89 (2) of the Tenancy Act has no independent operation aud refers only to sub-section (1), the Full Bench held that Sections 149 and 150 of the Land Revenue Act are designed only to invest the recording of evidence anJ the rendering of decision with a high degree of formality. The Full Bench rejected the argument that sub-section (2) of Section 89 of the Tenancy Act should be read as referring to the inquiries under Sections 149 and 150 of the Land Revenue Act. It was held that sub-section (2) of Sec. 89 must be given its proper meaning and effect and that the language of sub-section (2) of Section 89 was held to be wide in its scope and that there was no warrant for reading any words of limitation therein. It may be mentioned that, in the case before the Full Bench, the question arose whether Section 89 of the Tenancy Act conferred power of remand on the Collector. Section 89 (2) was relied on for the purpose of canvassing the plea that the Collector has the power of remand. In view of a seeming conflict in the decisions of this Court on the above point, the Full Bench had considered the matter at great length. The Full Bench referred to two leading decisions of the Supreme Court in the matter. The first case was Martin Burn Ltd vs. R.N. Banerjee wherein the scope of sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellant Tribunal) Act had come up for consideration. Interpreting the provisions of sub-section (1) of Sec. 9, the Supreme Court held: