GATTINENI RATTAMMA Vs. GATTINENI TIRUPATAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE unsuccessful plaintiff is the appellant herein. She was the owner of the plaint schedule property and she gifted the same under Ex. A-1 dt April 11. 1944 in favour of the first respondent, her brother's daughter reserving life estate in her. Subsequent thereto the first respondent donee executed a settlement deed Ex. A-2 dt June 2, 1969 giving away her vested remainder in favour of her sons, respondents 2 and 3. In the year 1971, the appellant filed the suit for declaration that the gift deed Ex. A-1 and the subsequent settlement deed Ex. A-2 are not binding on her since she executed Ex-1 as a nominal document and she never intended to act upon. THE trial Court after framing appropriate issues and adduction of evidence and consideration thereof dismissed the suit. On appeal it was confirmed.

(2.) IN this appeal, Sri N. Rajeswara Rao, learned coansel for the appellant argued that unless the gift is accepted by the respondent No 1, the gift becomes inoperative. There is no evidence to show that the first respondent accepted the gift under Ex. A-1 and now the,appellant resiled from the execution of th3 gift deed and thereby it became inoperative and it is not binding on the appellant. IN support of his contention he relied upon Venkata Subbamma V. Narayanaswami (1) 1954-1 M L J 194. IN Chapter VII of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), section 122 defines the 'gift'. It is a gratuitous transter of immoveable property by the donor in favour of the donee and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. The acceptance may be made during the life time of the donor while he is still capable of giving the gift. If the donee dies before aceptance, the gift is void. It is not in dispute that Ex. A-1 was duly executed and registered. Admittedly the donee was a minor at that time and her father was present as guardian at the time when it was registered. The appallant herself went to the Registrar's office and registered the document. It is also an admitted fact that she reserved life estate and she is in enjoyment of the property. The gifi deed Ex. A-1 is in her custody aIthrough. The contention is that there is no proof of acceptance of the gift and therefore it is inoperative and it is not binding on the appellant. No such plea was in fact taken in the plaint. it is true that therp must be evidence of acceptance and in its absence the gift becomes inoperative- The question is, whether there is acceptance of gift in this case. Even in Venkata Subbamma's case (1) (Supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, Satyanarayana Rao, J. has held that law requires acceptance which may even be implied. On the facts in that case it was held that there was no acceptance. The document was executed in that case on May 15, 1930. It was revoked on May 19, 1930. It was communicated in June 4, 1930. The document was continued to be in the custody of the plaintiff therein. Under those circumstances it was held that there is no acceptance of the gift, Therefore, the question is whether there is any acceptance by implication on the facts and circumstances of the case ? IN the instant case there are demonstrable circumstances to come to an unhesitating conclusion that there is acceptance of the gift, The fact that life interest is reserved in the appellant would go to establish that the appellant intended to keep the document with herself. Therefore the mere fact that the document was I in the custody of the appellant and she was in enjoyment of the property were not of consequence for in the document it is stated that the property stood vested in the donee (R-1). Her father was present on her behalf at the time of registration. The first respondent admittedly executed Ex. A-2 in her turn, the settlement deed in favour of sons giving away her vested remainder. Even the document was produced from the custody of the appellant in another suit 0 S 148/62 as spoken to by D W 2 in this case, to rely on the recitals of the deed. From these circumstances I have no hesitation to draw, by implication, of the acceptance of the gift by the first respondent. Accordingly, I hold that the gift hed been accepted and thereby the appellant is divested her proprieroty character except her life estate. It is operative and binding en (he appellant Accodingly the second appeal is dismissee, but without costs.