MOHD SIDDIQUE HUSSAIN Vs. DISTRICT COLLECTOR RANGAREDDY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a petition for issuance of a writ of Certiorari to quash the order of the 1st respondent confirming the order of the 2nd respondent. This writ petition arises under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act; 1955. It is stated that the petitioners are land holders of Ac. 83.00 in S. No. 219 situated in Gajula Rama ram village Medchal taluk, Rangareddy district. Respondents 3 and 4 claiming to be the original tenants to the extent of Ac. 20.00 filed an application before the Revenue Divisional Officer for grant of patta in November, 1981. The Revenue Divisional Officer granted occupancy certificate by an order dated 10-11-1981. Aggrieved by this order the petitioners filed an appeal before the Collector and the Collector confirmed the order.

(2.) The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the application filed in October, 1981 is beyond nine months stipulated under Rule 5 of the AP (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Rules, 1974 and should not have been entertained as the application is barred by time. It is further contended that the order is violative of principles of natural justice as notice contemplated under Rule 6 of the Rules was not given and in any event the order as confirmed is not in conformity with Section 8 of the Act. The learned Government Pleader and the learned counsel for respondents 3 and 4 contended that the scheme of the Act discloses that the enquiry regarding the nature of land can be done at any time and the rule cannot be construed as prescribing limitation when the provisions of the Act does not contemplate time limit. It is further contended that the requirement of issuance of notice provided under Rule 6 is satisfied and in any event the petitioner is not prejudiced and the question of consideration of requirements of Sec. 8 does not arise as the rights if any have to be worked out.

(3.) The initial contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Rule 5 of A. P. (Telangana Area) abolition of Inams Rules prescribes a period of ninety days for the application at the instance of the categories of persons enumerated therein for registration as an occupant and the proceedings of the Revenue Divisional Officer are beyond the time prescribed in Rule 5. To appreciate this contention it is necessary to have an in sight into the scheme of the Act with an accent on Sec. 10 and Sec. 24 of the Act; The A P. (Telangana Area) abolition of Inams Act, 1955 is one of the series of enactments in furtherance of agrarian reforms. Sec. 3 (1) of the Act envisages abolition and vesting of inams and the attendant consequences pursuant thereto. Sec. 3 (2) (b) postulates extin- guishment of all rights of the Inamdar except the interests expressly saved under the Act. Secs. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 enable the Inamdar, Kabido-e-Kazim permanent, protected and non-protected tenants to be registered as occupant on the satisfaction of the requirements embedded therein. Sec. 10 obligates the Collector to examine history and nature of all lands with reference to claim under sections 4 to 8. Sec. 24 provides for an appeal against the order or proceeding under Sec. 10. Sec. 30 empowers the Collector to authorise any officer to hold enquiries under the Act. Sec. 35 empowers the rule making authority to frame rules and sub-sec. 1 is concerned with the power to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act. Sub-sec. 2 (a) relates to matters expressly required or allowed to be prescribed under any of the provisions of the Act. Clause (c) of sub-sec. 2 pertains to the prescription of time within which applications and appeals to be presented under the Act in the absence of specific provision to that effect. Sec. 10 and Sec. 24 are essentially concerned with the determination of rights of the diverse categories comprised in Sections 4 to 8. Sec. 10 obligates the primary authority ie. Revenue Divisional Officer to have an in-depth scan of the history and nature of the lands in the process of determining the rights and Sec. 24 provides for appeal to the appellate authority ie. the Collector as against the orders passed under sec. 10. Sec. 24 specifically prescribes time within which appeals can be filed and also confers power upon the appellate authority to condone the delay in filing the appeal Sec. 24 and sec. 10 are self contained provisions pertaining to the powers to determine the rights and Sec. 24 regulates the time within which the appeal can be filed and Sec. 10 is not circumscribed by any time limit. The consicuous absence of provision of time bound programme indicates that the exercise of power under Sec. 10 is not hedged in by any time limit and the determination of right within a specified time is not intended by Sec. 10 as distinguished from Sec. 24. The pattern of determination of rights and exercise of power under Sec. 10 and Sec. 24 are similar save the difference of original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction. The appeal is a continuation of original proceedings and in view of the absence of provision for time limit in original proceedings it can be reasonably deduced from the combined reading of Sec. 10 and Sec. 24 that Sec. 10 did not intend to impose fetter of time limit. The context and set-up of Sec. 10 and sec. 24 disclose that both the provisions are self contained and unequivocally defied any prescription by extraneous provisions. In this view the rules made pursuant to sec. 35 cannot make inroads into the self contained scheme transparent in sec. 10 and sec. 24. Sec. 35 (1) cannot be invoked for the prescription of time limit as it cannot be considered as carrying out the purpose of the Act. Sub-sec. 2 (a) cannot be pressed into service as there is no explicit provision tolerating any prescription. Sec. 35 (2) (c) also cannot be invoked as Sec. 10 expressly intended that there should not be any time limit in exercise of power under this provision. Therefore, it is obvious that the scheme of the provisions of the Act and particularly Sec. 10 and Sec. 24 does not permit any prescription by rules regarding time for the exercise of power and considered from this perspective Rule 5, seeking percolate into Sec. 10 by prescribing time has gone astray. The learned Government Pleader referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co, Pvt. Ltd. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation (1) A. I. R. 1972 S.C. 1935 wherein it is held that the omission to provide the period of limitation under Sections 68 and 75 of the Employees Insurance Act while providing for limitation of claim by an employee for the payment of any benefit under the regulations shows clearly that the legislaturedid not intend to fetter the claim under Sec. 75 (2) (d). In this context it is held at page 1940 as follows :