KASIREDDY PAPAIAH DIED Vs. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners own small extents of land altogether of the extent of 3 acres and 17 cents in Reddipalli Village, Bheemunipatnam Taluk, Visakhapatnam District. A notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act proposing to acquire the lands of the petitioners for the purpose of providing house sites for Harijans was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette on 24-9-1970. The notification itself bore the date 15-5-1970. By the same notification the power under Section 17 (4) of the Act was invoked and the enquiry contemplated by Section 5-A was dispensed with. Thereafter, the draft declaration under Section 6 of the Act was approved by the Government in G. O. Rt. No 2283 Education (S.W.) Department dated 22-12-1970 and was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette on 25-2-1971. No steps were, however, taken to take possession of the lands. On 16-9-1971 the petitioners filed the present application for the issue of a writ to Quash the notification dated 19-5-1970.

(2.) The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the very fact that the Government took the decision to acquire the lands on 19-5-1970 but did not publish the notification in the gazette till 24-9-1970, the further fact that the notification under Section 6 was only published on 25-2-1971 and the circumstances that no steps have so far been taken to take possession of the land clearly demonstrated that there was no urgency whatever and that the invocation of the power under Section 17 (4) of the Act to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A was made in a mechanical fashion because of a memorandum issued by the Government in 1954 to the effect that the emergency provision should be invoked whenever land was acquired for providing house sites for Harijans. I am not prepared to agree with the submission that delay on the part of tardy officials to take the further action in the matter is sufficient to nullify the urgency which existed at the time of the issue of the notification and to hold that there was never any urgency. It may be a relevant circumstance to be taken into consideration in deciding whether there was any urgency at all or whether the emergency provision was invoked without the Government applying its mind to the circumstances of the case. That the housing conditions of Harijans all over the country continue to be miserable even today is a fact of which courts are bound to take judicial notice. History has made it urgent that, among other problems, the problem of housing Harijans should be solved expeditiously. The greater the delay the more urgent becomes the problem. Therefore, one can never venture to say that the invocation of the emergency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for providing house sites for Harijans is bad merely because the officials entrusted with the task of taking further action in the matter are negligent or tardy in the discharge of their duties, unless, of course, it can be established that the acquisition itself is made with an oblique motive. The urgent pressures of history are not to be undone by the inaction of the bureaucracy. I am not trying to make any pontific pronouncements. But I am at great pains to point out that provision for house sites for Harijans is an urgent and pressing necessity and that the invocation of the emergency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be said to be improper, in the absence of mala fides, merely because of the delay on the part of some Government officials. As already observed by me, the greater the delay the greater the urgency. Of course, there may be cases where the very acquisition is mala fide and so too the invocation of the urgency provisions. We are not concerned with such a situation here as there are no allegations of mala fides. The learned counsel for the petitioners stated that the land of the petitioners was low lying land, that the Harijans themselves did not want this land and that there was other land on a higher level which the Harijans wanted and which could be acquired instead of the land of the petitioners. That is not a matter about which I am competent to express an opinion. But a perusal of the counter-affidavit shows that all these matters were considered both before and after the notification under Section 4 (1) was published. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decision of Ramachandra Rao, J. in W. P. 61/73* where the learned Judge observed:--

(3.) The learned counsel next submitted that the mandatory requirements of Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act had not been observed in that, the Collector did not cause public notice of the substance of the notification to be given at convenient places in the locality and, therefore, the entire proceedings were void. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Khubchand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1074 where it was observed :