PAMPANA SURYARAO Vs. SEELAM NAGESWARARAO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two writ petitions have been heard together as desired by the learned Counsel appearing in them because they raise substantially the same questions for decision. These petitions ask for certiorari to quash certain orders passed by the Election Commissioner appointed under the Rules for Decision of Election Disputes under the Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920-hereinafter called the Rules. Writ Petition No. 388 of 1964 relates to an election to the Ramachandra'puram Municipal Council from Ward No . 6. The petitioner was declared elected.

(2.) Thereupon the respondent, who was the rival candidate at the election, filed an Election Petition before the Election Commissioner under rule 2 of the Rules for setting aside the election and declaring him duly elected. One of the main grounds for impugning the validity of petitioner's election was that, there was impersonation of dead voters. A schedule to the election petition mentioned the names of 8 dead persons who were allegedly impersonated at the election. Under rule 2 (1), the election petition had to be filed within seven days from the date of declaration of the result of the election. The election petition in question was preferred within this period of limitation, that is to say, on 26th August, 1963. But on I7th January, 1964, the election petitioner filed LA. No. 59 of 1964 seeking permission to amend the schedule to the election petition by adding the names of three more dead persons who also were alleged to have been impersonated at the election. This application was resisted by the successful candidate on the ground that the Election Commissioner had no power or jurisdiction to allow an election petition to be amended. The Election Commissioner overruled this objection and allowed the amendment. The successful candidate has therefore come up to this Court in Writ Petition No. 388 of 1964. The facts in Writ Petition No. 389 of 1964 are these : The election was from Ward No. 11 of Ramachandrapuram Municipality which was double member woman's constituency. One candidate for the general seat and another for the reserved seat were to be elected. The petitioner is the successful candidate, for the reserved seat. The first respondent preferred an election petition on 26th. August, 1963, under rule 2 challenging the validity of the election from Ward No. 11. One of the main grounds in support of the election petition was that, contrary to the prohibition imposed by section 47 of the Madras District Municipalities Act, two named persons, who were alleged to be lepers voted at the election for the successful candidate. On 17th January, 1964 the election petitioner-first respondent in W.P. No. 389 of 1964-perferred 1. A. No. 57 ot 1964 for amending the election petition by adding the names of three more persons who were also alleged to be lepers but who voted at the election in favour of the successful candidate, contrary to the provisions of section 47 of the Madras District Municipalities Act. The successful candidate resisted this application for amendment on the ground that the Election Commissioner had no power or jurisdiction to allow the amendment. The Election Commissioner repelled this contention and permitted the election petition to be amended as asked for. The successful candidate has, therefore, moved this Court in Writ Petition No. 383 of 1964 to quash the order of the Election Commissioner. Two main contentions have been put forward in support of these writ petitions : (1) that the Election Commissioner has no power to allow amendment of an election petition and (2) even if he has such power he cannot exercise it after the expiry of the period of 7 days prescribed for filing the election petition. The learned Counsel for the contesting respondents has, on the other hand, urged that he Election Gommissioner has ample power and jurisdiction not only to allow an amendment but also to allow it after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing the election petition. This is the scope of the controversy in chese writ petitions. The decision turns largely on the true meaning and import of rule 6 which reads :

(3.) There does not appear to be anything in this rule which either expressly or by necessary implication denies wholly to an Election Commissioner the power to allow amendment of an election petition filed before him. Rule 6 requires an election petition to be inquired into by an Election Commissioner " as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code ot Civil Procedure, 1908, to the trial of suit." This provision appears to me to be of sufficient width to comprehend the power to allow amendments of election petitions. I think when a quasi-judicial tribunal is set up to adjudicate upon disputes between parties, a Court should not be astute to discover grounds for .cutting down the, powers of the quasi-Judge, more especially so, when that is likely to render it difficult for him to do necessary justice .between the parties. On the other hand, I consider it to be a wholesome rule to construe the relevant provisions, wherever possible, in such a manner as to clothe the quasi-judicial Tribunal with sufficient power to enable it to do justice to those who resort to it. This approach is necessary to ensure the satisfactory and efficient functioning of a quasi-Judge. I am therefore of the view that unless the relevant provision expressly or by necessary intendment deprives a quasi- judicial Tribunal of a power which it is necessary to exercise in the interests of justice and for the effective adjudication of the controversy between the parties before it, it will not be proper for a Court to hold as a matter of construction that the Tribunal does not have the power. Turning to rule 6, I am not able to see anything in it which militates against holding that the Election Commissioner has the power to allow amendments of election petitions. But it is argued that the Explanation to the rule which enumerates six different powers are exhaustive and that the Election Commissioner cannot exercise any other power. This contention does not appeal to me. To accept it .will be to let the explanation drastically override the main provision itself. This is not a reasonable or permissible mode of interpretation. The true construction is that the powers specified under the Explanation are only illustrative and not exhaustive and that their enumeration does not circumscribe the amplitude of the words of the main provision. In Harisk Chandra v. Triloki Singh, (1957) S.C.J. 297 : A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 444, the Supreme Court construed similar words of section qo (2) of the Representation of the People Act as conferring on the Election Tribunal powers of amendment under Order 6, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code. It was so held in spite of the circumstance that certain powers under the Code of Civil Procedure exercisable by the Election Tribunal were specifically enumerated in section 92 of the Representation of the People Act. The Explanation to rule 6 is substantially similar to section 92 of the Representation of the People Act which the Supreme Court considered in the case cited above.