STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH Vs. SHAIK SABHANUDDIN ALLAHUDDIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two appeals arise out of the judgment of the Third Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, at Secunderabad, in O. S. No. 55 of 1960. The plaintiff in this suit was a Sub-Inspector, who served in the former Government of Hyderabad. He was appointed on 1-8-1947. In the course of his service, he was attached to the Railway Police. There was a departmental enquiry against him on charges of alleged misconduct in the discharge of his official duties, and he was discharged from service by an order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, C. I. D. and Railways dated 7-8-1950. The Government rejected his appeal against the order discharging him. Thereafter he instituted a suit on 31-1-1955 for a declaration that the order of suspension dated 30-1-1950 and the order of discharge dated 7-8-1950 were null and void and claiming consequential reliefs of reinstatement, damages and arrears of salary against the Government. He filed the suit in forms pauperis claiming Rs. 10,000/- as and for damages for his mental worry and the balance as arrears of salary from the date of his suspension. The suit was dismissed under its old No. O. S. 37 of 1995 in the first instance on 18-4-1956. He applied against the said judgment dismissing his suit, and a Division Bench of this Court allowed his appeal, A. S. 65 of 1958, finding that the officer who passed the order of discharge had not given him the notice contemplated under Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and so the order of discharge could not be sustained. So, the learned Judges remanded the suit for consideration of the other issues. The learned advocate for the plaintiff would appear to have filed a memo before the trial Court on 10-12-1960 stating that in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court only issues 7 and 8 fell to be considered. These issues related to the damages claimed by the plaintiff, arrears of salary and other incidental reliefs. No fresh evidence was let in after remand. Arguments were addressed by the counsel on either side. An additional issue was, however, settled at the instance of the learned Government Pleader whether the suit was barred by time. The learned trial Judge held that the order discharging the appellant was null and void and inoperative, that the suit was governed by Art. 120 of the Limitation act and was, therefore, in time, and decreed the suit for arrears of salary from the date of suspension upto the date of filling the suit. He also directed reinstatement of the plaintiff in service. The damages prayed for were rejected. The suit being in forma papueris, the trial Court decreed that the plaintiff and the defendant shall pay the Court-fee in equal moieties. Against the said judgment and decree of the trial Court, the Government of Andhra Pradesh, defendant in the suit, being the successor Government, has preferred C. C. C. A. 63 of 1961. The plaintiff preferred an appeal, C. C. C. A. 24 of 1962 claiming that he should have been granted salary till actual reinstatement and seniority and other consequential benefits.

(2.) In support of the appeal preferred by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, the learned Government Pleader has raised two points : Firstly, that Article 14 of the Limitation Act governs the suit and not Article 120 as found by the learned trial Judge and so the suit is barred by time. Secondly, that the plaintiff would be entitled to arrears of salary for only three years prior to suit under Art. 102 of the Indian Limitation Act, and that the judgment of the trial Court awarding him arrears of salary from the date of his suspension i.e. 30-1-1950 till the date of his filling the suit i.e. 31-1-1955 is wrong.

(3.) Taking the first point, it is appropriate that I peruse Art. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, which is as follows : - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Description of suit. Period of limitation. Time from which period begin to run. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ To set aside any act or order of an Officer of Government in his One year. The date of the act or order . official capacity not herein otherwise expressly provided for. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ The learned Government Pleader has addressed arguments emphasizing the words in the first column as not restricting the application of the Article to acts or orders other than void acts or orders. He has also argued that assuming that the Article does not apply to void acts or orders of the officer of the Government, the order in the instant case discharging the plaintiff would only be irregular for non-compliance with the issue of the notice contemplated under Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and not void. It does not, however, appear that the points of view presented by the learned Government Pleader are consistent with the trend of decisions which cover both the aspects. There are any number of judicial pronouncements to the effect that Article does not apply to a case where the order of officer is null and void. I shall be presently referring to the decisions on the point. If so, the construction of the words in column No. 1 as embracing void orders of the officer of the Government as well cannot be supported. The second aspects of the case presented by the learned Government pleader that non-compliance in the instant case would only make the order irregular and not void runs counter to the trend of decisions.