DAVALURI RAMAIAH Vs. BODEPUDI VENKATASUBBAIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The problem that requires solution in this Letters Patent Appeal is whether the property allotted to the last male owner for his share at a partition with his coparceners falls within the ambit of the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 (hereinafter referred to as Act II of 1929).

(2.) The facts giving rise to this appeal lie in a short compass and are as follows : The properties in dispute originally belonged to one Davuluri Subbaiah having been allotted to his share in a partition with his brother Nagaiah. Subbaiah died on 16th June, 1912 survived by his widow Lingamma and three sisters by name Peramma, Kotamma and Veeramma. After the death of Subbaiah, his widow enjoyed these properties as limited owner. On her death, the properties were claimed by the adopted sons of Kotamma and Veeramma. As the right of these two persons was resisted by a person claiming to be the adopted son of Lingamma, the adopted son of Veeramma was obliged to file a suit for a decree for partition and allotment of one share to him and another to the adopted son of Kotamma who was impleaded as the 2nd defendant and the person who opposed the claim as the first defendant.

(3.) The suit was contested only by the fust defendant, inter alia, on the defence that he being the adopted son of Subbaiah was the real owner of the property. The trial Court while holding that the first defendant had not established that he was adopted by Lingamma, dismissed the suit on the grounds that the plaintiff was not adopted during the life-time of Veeramma and that section 2 of Act II of 1929 was inapplicable to the property of the description involved in this suit. The lower appellate Court while disagreeing with the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff was not adopted by Veeramma, affirmed the decision in agreement with his conclusion as to the applicability of Act II cf 1929. Aggrieved by this decree, the plaintiff brought a second appeal to this Court contending that Act II of 1929 governed the instant case. Our learned brother Justice Seshachelapati reversed the decision of the Courts below having reached the conclusion that the property in question fell within the purview of Act II of 1929. It is this view of the learned Ji dge that is assailed in this appeal filed with his leave. It is convenient at this stage to turn to the provisions of Act II of 1929, round which the controversy revolves in this appeal. Sub-section (2) of section 1 of that Act provides :