JAGARAPU THATAYYA ALIAS TATALU Vs. KASDIREDDI VENKATARAMANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These nine Second Appeals arise out of nine suits instituted by the respondent-plaintiff against nine different tenants in reference to nine different plots of land. It was alleged inter alia in the plaint that the plaintiff purchased this land on 26th March, 1958, through Exhibit A-1 from one Satyanarayana Rao Naidu who was the owner of the same. The said Satyanarayana Rao Naidu had leased out different plots of lands to different persons who were defendants in the suits under Exhibit A-66 dated the 2nd July, 1938, and other similar lease deeds while in some cases oral agreement of lease is alleged. The plaintiff stated that as the defendants have defaulted and are denying the title of the plaintiff, he should be put back in possession of the lands. The defence raised by the defendants was that, they have been in possession of the lands since a considerable time, that they have not paid any rents after 1939 and that the suits for recovery of possession, therefore, are time-barred under Article 139. An additional plea is raised in this Court that the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (XV of 1960) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) applies to the facts of this case and civil Court cannot entertain the present suits. The trial Court, after recording the evidence, decreed the plaintiff's suits. It was found that the defendants are the tenants that they have been paying the rents to the landlord and that now they are defaulters and they are liable to be evicted. In regard to the question of limitation, it was found that the suits of the plaintiffs are within limitation. The appellate Court upheld the decision of the trial Court. It is this concurrent view of the Courts below which is now challenged before me in these second appeals.

(2.) Two contentions are raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants. It was firstly urged that Article 139 of the Indian Limitation Act applies to the cases and as the suits have been instituted by the plaintiff after 12 years of the determination of the lease, the suits are time-barred. In order to succeed on the plea of limitation, it was necessary for the defendants to prove that the lease was in each case determined in 1939 as is now argued. Under section in of the Transfer of Property Act, the lease is determined by efflux of time also. What is now contended is that the lease was for a year and the moment one year elapsed the lease stood determined. What is however ignored in advancing this argument is that, under section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, if the tenant continues in possession and pays rent which is accepted by the landlord, then he shall be deemed to have continued as tenant under the principle of holding over. The Courts below have found that the defendants have admitted in Exhibit A-127 and Exhibit A-128, apart from the admission contained in reference to the criminal proceedings of 1953, that they have been paying the rents for the last over thirty years. The admission contained in Exhibit A-127 was made on 23rd May, 1358. It is thus clear that the defendants were in possession as tenants holding over. There can be little doubt in this case that the lessor and subsequently his legal representative accepted rent till 1958 from the lessees and agreed that they should continue in possession ; the consequence of which is that the tenancy would be deemed to have been renewed as per section 116, Transfer of Property Act, unless some agreement to the contrary is pleaded. No such agreement is pleaded by the defendants. The result, therefore, which must follow is that, the defendants' possession till 1958 was under the renewed leases according to section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act and those leases could be deemed to have been determined only in 1959 because thereafter there is no evidence to show that holding over took place. Thus the leases stood determined in 1959. As the suit was laid within twelve years from such determination of the leases the suits cannot be said to have been time-barred. I am not persuaded to agree with the contention that as there is no direct evidence of the payment of the rent, the leases would be deemed to have been terminated in 1939. The very admission contained in Exhibit A-127 provides enough proof of the fact that the defendants have paid the rent and that the lessor and his legal representative have accepted such rent till 1958. I therefore, find no difficulty in rejecting the first submission. It was then contended that the Rent Act applies to the facts of the case and the landlprd ought to have approached the Rent Court rather than the civil Court for possession. At the outset it must be mentioned that this plea was not raised in the Courts below nor has it been specifically raised in the grounds of appeal. I do not however think that I should decline the permission to raise that point in these second appeals. I have, therefore heard the learned Advocates in regard to that plea also. What is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants is that, as the plots of lands were leased out to the defendants for the purpose of erecting huts thereupon and because of the renewal of leases after such buildings were erected, by virtue of section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, the lease would be that of the building and not only of a vacant piece of land. In support of this contention reliance is placed on the following cases : Palaniappa Chettiar v. Babu Sahib, (1964) 1 M.L.J. 110. Palaniappa Ckettiar v. Vairavan Chetiar, (1963) 1 M.L.J. 130. and Irani v. Chidambaram Ckettiar, (1952) 2 M.L.J. 221.

(3.) In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to look into the definition of 'building' occurring in the Act. That definition reads as follows :-