V G RANGA MUNUSWAMY Vs. ILLUPAVOOR RAMAMURTHY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondents are landholders whose estates were taken over by the Government under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act. The Director of Settlements deposited the final compensation due to the respondents under section 41 of the Act on 27th June, 1959. The petitioners are holders of valid money decrees against the respondents. Under section 42 1(1) of the Art they are entitled to apply to the Tribunal with whom the final compensation due to the respondents is deposited for payment to them of the amounts due to them under their decrees The petitioner in each of these revisions made an application to that effect to the Estate Abolition Tribunal at Chittoor on 7th September 1960 and 22nd September, 1960, respectively. Along with these two applications they also filed two other applications requesting the tribunal to expend time in their favour for making the claims under section 42 so as to cover the delay on their part The tribunal declined to extend time and dismissed the applications for payment of the monies due to the petitioners under their decrees.

(2.) There is another important circumstance which has to be mentioned It is that although the deposit was made by the Director of Settlements with the tribunal on 27th June, 1959, it was published in the Official Gazette only on 16th March 1961. There is an express rule made under section 41 of the Act requiring the Dnector of Settlements to publish the fact of the deposit in the Official Gazette as soon as it is made in the Office oi the Tribunal-vide G.O.Ms. No 1254 Rev dated 27th April, 1950 This rule is obviously intended to enable prospective claimants to obtain notice of the deposit. But for such notice, it would be extremely difficult it not altogether impossible, for them to make an application under section 429(d) within the prescribed period of six months irom the date of the deposit As in the instant cases the publication of the fact of the deposit was made only on i6th Match 1961, that is to say, about six months after the date of the petitioner' application under section 42 (0, I think there was good reason and justification for the tribunal to take a liberal view of the matter and grant further time in favour of the petitioners under section 42 (1) and thereby save them from alleged delay. To put it at the lowest, 1 think the Tribunal could well have condoned the delay, if any on the part of the petitioners in making the applications under section 42 (1) It appears, to me to be only reasonable to regard the publication of the fact of the deposit as, required by the rule already referred to as obligatory on the part of the Director of Settlements and as necessary to make a valid deposit under section 41 of the Act In other words, the deposit ot the sum of money with the tribunal and the DubJi' cation of it in the Official Gazette are integral parts ot the same uansaction one part of it being as important as the other for the purpose of starting the limitation prescribed by section 42 (1). Therefore, the mere deposit of a sum of money unaccompanied by the publication ol it in the Official Gazette would not start the period of limitation against a prospective claimant. In this view, the applications, under section 42 (1) made by the petitioners cannot be said to be beyond the prescribed period oi limitation. It would be wholly unreasonable to say that a unilateral action of depositing a sum of money in the office of the Tribunal taken by the Director of Settlements without any intimation whatsoever to any claimants would constitute a starting point ol limitation against the claimants. The result of holding otherwise would be to make the claims, however valid and bona fide berred by limitation even before the claimants had even an inkling of the deposit under section 41 (1) or of the date thereof. Such an unreasonable result could not have been intended by the Legislature. Section 41 (1) itself contemplates the making of rules regarding deposit. Therefore, the rule regarding immediate publication of the fact of deposit should be given due importance and play in the matter of determining whether a claim made under section. 42 is within the prescribed time or not.

(3.) In this view, it cannot be said that the claims made by the petitioners were out of time. But I do not think it is necessary to decide this point in these cas s because even it this view is not taken there was sufficient ground lor the tribunal to extend time in favour of the petitioners and condone their delay. This I think was the minimum which the tiibunal ought to have done in the interests of justice and in consonance with judical discretion.