VIZIANAGARAM MUNICIPALITY Vs. PUVVADA BHASKARA RAO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These appeals raise a short question as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to interfere with assessment made by the authorities under the District Municipalities Act. Whereas, S. A. Nos. 10 and 1028/61 and 120/62 are concerned with the assessments made by the executive officer in the purported exercise of his authority under r. 10 of Schedule IV of the District Municipalities Act (V of 1920), the other two appeals are concerned with the assessment made by the Valuation Officer as upheld ultimately by the Municipal Appellate Council. It would appear from the facts of the first set of appeals that in the quinquennial general revision in 1957 the Valuation Officer appointed by the Government raised the tax of the buildings assessing their annual rental value at a very high figure. The revising authority in the subject matter of appeal in S. A. 1027/1961 and the appellate Municipal Council in all other cases considerably reduced the tax. Notwithstanding that the matter was thus finally settled, the executive officer within a few months thereafter in the year 1958 in the purported exercise of his authority under r. 11 enhanced the tax under a special notice to a figure even higher than the original tax, and in certain cases it was out of all proportion to the original levy made by Valuation Officer. Further it was made retrospective to a date falling within 35 days from the municipal appellate councils decision. The assessees therefore brought their respective suits calling in question the assessment on the ground that it is arbitrary and capricious and virtual violation of the order of the appellate authority and contrary to the provisions of the Act and that it is void and inoperative. In S. A. 1027/1961 it was further urged that the executive Officer had proposed to enhance the rate only after his efforts to secure a portion of the premises for the municipal high school without any condition attached to such sublease had failed. It was contended that this step was not bona fide and the assessment was made in negation of the accepted canons of assessment and ignoring the rental deeds produced. Both the District Munsif and the District Judge found that the increase in the half-yearly tax by the Commissioner was quite arbitrary, capricious and without any just or reasonable basis and the action of the Commissioner is open to question in a civil Court. Similar was the view expressed in S. A. Nos 1028/1961 and 120/1962.

(2.) The facts out of which the second set of appeals (i.e., S. As. 1029/61 and 1031/61) arise are these :- In S. A. 1029/61 in quinquennial general revision for the year 1957, the valuation officer had levied a tax of Rs. 1283-0-9 taking the annual rental value as Rs. 8328. The revising authority dismissed the revision and confirmed the assessment but the appellate council reduced the tax too Rs. 1125. Prior to the general revision the building was assessed to a tax of Rs. 970-9-6 showing the annual rental value at Rs. 6300 only. The assessee therefore brought a suit on the ground that the assessment made by the valuation officer as upheld by the appellate Council proceeded on a wrong basis which did not conform with the provisions of the Act. The learned District Judge found that the assessment was based not merely on the rental value of furniture as well, and the calculation was therefore wholly erroneous and not in compliance with the provisions of the Act. In S. A. 1031/ 1961 of course the quantum when compared to the tax payable before the quinquennial revision is not high but the plea was taken on the basis that the rental value has not been calculated on the basis of the registered lease deed about which there is no dispute that it is either collusive or fictitious. Both the courts below have taken exception to the method adopted by the assessing authority as it was not quite in consonance with Ss. 81 and 82 of the District Municipalities Act. Thus it would appear that the assessment has been sought to be interfered with on the basis that it is only arbitrary and capricious but also there was no just or proper basis for making such assessment and it is not in conformity with the provisions of the Act.

(3.) The main contention raised by the learned counsel Mr. Venkatappayya Sastry is that the civil courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with the assessment made under the District Municipalities Act by reason of S. 354 and the suits therefore were liable to be dismissed. His next string of argument proceeds on the contention that where a hierarchy of officers has been created under the statute and the remedy to get the wrong redressed has been provided thereunder, it is not open to a party to come to the civil court and / or at any rate without exhausting all the remedies open to him under the statute. We examine how far these contentions are tenable. The first contention turns upon the true interpretation of S. 354. The said provision reads thus : - "(1) No assessment or demand made, and no charge imposed under the authority of this Act shall be impeached or affected by reason of any clerical error or by reason of any mistake (a) in respect of the name, residence, place of business or occupation of any person, or (b) in the description of any property or thing, or (c) in respect of the amount assessed, demanded or charged : Provided that the provisions of this Act have been, in substance and effect complied with. And no proceedings under this Act shall, merely for defect in form, be quashed or set aside by any court of justice. (2) * * * * * *" The ouster of civil courts jurisdiction under this provisions is not in terms complete. It is but partial and is limited to the language and intendment of the provisions. It says that the impeachment of any assessment or demand or charge imposed under the authority of the Act is not permissible on the ground that there has been a clerical error or some mistake inter alia in respect of the amount assessed. Thus the jurisdiction of the Court to this extent alone and no further is affected by the provision . But even to attract this limitation on jurisdiction the requisite essential as provided by the section itself is that the provisions of the Act have been in substance and effect complied with by the authority concerned while making such assessment. So, then, if, in making the assessment, the provisions of the Act have not been correctly appreciated or followed, evidently the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation thereto must remain unaffected. It follows therefore where there is no basis on which the levy has been made, or the basis adopted is wrong or arbitrary or the tax is levied on surmises or even on an erroneous view of the statutory provisions of the Act, S. 354 will not stand as a bar against the interference by a civil Court.