GANTA VEERAMALH Vs. TALLAPPALLU KOMARAIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short question which this enquiry poses is whether Exhibit A-2, the suit promissory note is admissible in evidence. Admittedly, the promissory note is not properly stamped and both the Courts below have come to the conclusion that it is not admissible in evidence. The trial Court, however, curiously held that although it is not admissible to prove the terms of the document, it can be used in evidence for collateral purposes. That view obviously was wrong. Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act precludes its admissibility for all purposes. The lower appellate Court therefore was quite justified in saying that the promissory note is inadmissible and cannot be used for any purpose. This proposition of law is conceded What is, however, argued by Mr. V. Madhava Rao, the learned Counsel for the appellants, is that, when once the promissory note is used in evidence, section 36 of the Stamp Act precludes the defendant from raising any objection at a subsequent stage of the suit regarding its admissibility. The argument is attractive at the first sight, but after a careful consideration, I am satisfied that it has no substance. What had happened in this case was that, in the written statement the defendant had clearly objected to its admissibility in evidence. That the document is undoubtedly marked is indicated from the signature of the District Munsif and it has been used in evidence, but this procedure adopted by the District Munsif obviously was subject to the objection raised by the defendant. Admittedly, the District Munsif has not applied his judicial mind before it was marked or shown to the witnesses in regard to the question whether the objection raised by the defendant is sound or not. It is now an accepted proposition of law that the words " admitted in evidence " appearing in section 36 of the Stamp Act mean " admitted after judicial consideration of the circumstances relating to its admissibility " . It can only mean the act of letting the document in as part of the evidence, but it must be let in as a result of judicial determination of the question whether it can be admitted in evidence or not for want , of stamp. On the day when the document was shown to the witnesses and marked, admittedly the.District Munsif has not applied his mind to the admissibility of the document and consequently there has been no judicial determination in regard to the objection raised by the defendant. Merely because the document is marked or shown to a witness, it would not mean that the objection raised by the defendant has been rejected. There is absolutely no record to show that on that day or any day before that the Distiict Munsif determined judicially the question in regard to the admissibility of this document particularly when there was a specific objection in that behalf raised in the written statement. I am not therefore persuaded to agree with the contention that in spite of the fact that the District Munsif may not have judicially determined anything about the admissibility, merely because the document is marked and shown to the witness, section 36 applies. Mr. Madhava Rao relies upon Jagmohandas v. Kishen, A.I.R. 1957 Hyd. 37. and Sehilizadi Nazerunnisa Begum v. Lakshman, (1957) A.L.J. 284.

(2.) As far as the general proposition is concerned that once any unstamped or ill-stamped instrument is admitted in evidence, no objection to its admissibility can be raised at any subsequent stage of the suit it need not be disputed. The real question however is whether the document has been admitted in evidence within the connotation of section 36. In this case I have no shred of doubt that the document has not been admitted within the meaning of section 36, as no judicial mind was applied to the central question of admissibility and the objection of the defendant was not considered at all at that stage. In fact it is clear from the judgment of the District Munsif that he considered that objection of the defendant at the time of the final disposal of the case. As stated earlier, he however reached the curious conclusion that although the document is inadmissible in evidence, it can be used for a limited purpose. That, as stated before, is not the correct position of law. It is evident from the judgment therefore that the defendants' objection was not disposed of prior to the marking of the document. The document therefore was marked subject to the final judicial determination of the objection raised by the defendant which finds its disposal in the judgment. The marking of the document and the showing of it to the witness therefore is not of much significance in the abovesaid circumstances. The abovesaid rulings relied upon by the learned Counsel therefore can be distinguished on the facts, of those cases.

(3.) Even otherwise assuming that the document is used in evidence and no objection regarding its admissibility can be raised at a subsequent stage, even then it does not advance the case of the plaintiffs very much. Admittedly the promissory note is not supported by any simultaneous consideration The plaintiffs admitted that the consideration had passed long before, and in order to prove that he produced P.W. 1 and P.W. 4 and also produced a hand-book. The lower appellate Court discussing P.Ws. 1 and 4 refused to place any reliance on that oral evidence. The hand-book does not contain, the signature of the defendant. No satisfactory explanation is offered as to why his signature was not obtained when the entry was made in his presence. When, in fact, it is found that there is no consideration to this promissory note, it does not serve any purpose to find out whether the objection can be raised regarding the admissibility of the promissory note after it was marked. I have already stated that even if the argument of the learned Counsel of the appellants is accepted, it does not help him in the circumstances of the case. For both these reasons I disallow this appeal with costs. No leave. Appeal dismissed.