(1.) The debtors are the appellants. The simple question is whether section 9 or section 13 of Act (IV of 1938) applies to this case. Both the Courts below, following the decision in Thiruvengadatha Aiyangar v. Sannappan Servai1, held that as the promissory note was executed after the passing of Madras Act (IV of 1938), section 13 alone applied to the case. The learned Judges discussed the scheme of the Act and held that section 13 applied to all debts incurred after the commencement of the Act, whether they be in discharge of prior debts or not. That decision has not been dissented from but has been applied in all the subsequent cases by the Madras High Court. In Krishnayya v. Venkata Subbarayudu2, following that decision, Mr. Justice Subba Rao (as he then was) held as follows :- "Section 13 governed all debts whether incurred for the first time or renewed in respect of earlier debts, if they were incurred or renewed after the Act came into force." As pointed out in Suryanarayana v. Alavandara Rao3 : "It is well settled that a debt incurred after the commencement of Madras Act (IV of 1938) cannot be scaled down except in accordance with section 13 of that Act."
(2.) So there is no force in the argument of the learned advocate for the appellants that the debt must be traced back to 1937, or that the payment already made should be reappropriated by applying section 9. The second appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave.
(3.) The Civil Revision Petition is filed as against an order passed by the Subordinate Judge of Narasapur refusing to amend the decree in regard to the interest allowed by the District Munsif in respect of the amount found due by him Though in the judgment no subsequent interest was provided for, the decree was correctly drafted and interest was awarded on the sum of Rs. 1 ,408-3-0. The respondent did not prefer an appeal as interest was provided for under the decree. The contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners that inasmuch as there was no provision for interest in the judgment, it ought not to have been included in the decree is, in my opinion, without much substance. It is unnecessary for me to discuss the scope and effect of section 34, Civil Procedure Code. As the second appeal is before me, I award interest on the sum decreed.