(1.) THE 1st respondent (for short the respondent) filed O.S No. 997 of 2003 in the Court of XI Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against the appellant and the 2nd respondent for eviction from the suit schedule properties. It was pleaded that the respondent is the absolute owner of the suit schedule premises comprising an open land of 550 square yards and that the same was leased out to the appellant in the year 1978 initially at a rent of Rs. 105 per month and by 1986, it was enhanced to Rs. 250/ -. It was pleaded that the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 do not apply to the tenancy since what was leased is only an open land. The respondent pleaded that Ex.A -2 quit notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was issued on 27 -07 -2003 and in spite of receiving the same, the appellant did not vacate the premises.
(2.) THE appellant filed a written statement opposing the suit. It was pleaded that the respondent is not the owner of the premises and that the Government of Andhra Pradesh filed L.G.C No. 175 of 1997 before the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short, the Act) in respect of the suit schedule property as well as considerable extent in the neighbourhood against several persons and that an order of eviction was passed in the L.G.C. He pleaded that the trial Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
(3.) SRI D. Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that the suit schedule property was the subject matter of L.G.C No. 175 of 1997 and once the Special Court has taken up adjudication of the matter, a civil Court cannot entertain the suit in respect of that very property. He submits that the order of eviction was passed in the L.G.C and challenging the same, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 26599 of 2011 and that an order of interim stay was granted in W.P.M.P No. 32831 of 2011 on 27 -09 -2011. He submits that though these important facts were pleaded before the trial Court and the lower appellate Court, they were not taken into account, at all. He submits that even otherwise, the relationship between the appellant and the respondent as lessee and lessor was not established and a stray sentence in the cross examination in relation to Ex.A -3 which was said to be a reply, was treated as the basis for existence of relationship.