S. RAVINDER Vs. BHASKARTEJA AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Criminal Appeal under Section 378 (5) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the judgment dated 15.12.2005 in C.C.No.720 of 2002 passed by the IV Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Warangal, acquitting the Accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

(2.) The unsuccessful complainant of C.C.No.720 of 2002 on the file of the IV Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Warangal, filed for the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for brevity "the N.I. Act") against the 1st respondent/Accused M/s. Bhaskarteja Chits and Finance Private Limited, represented by its Managing Director E. Madhav Rao, impugning the acquittal judgment dated 15.12.2005 of the trial Court, preferred this appeal raising the contentions in the grounds of appeal that the trial went wrong with improper appreciation of the evidence on record and the acquittal judgment is contrary to law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case, that the trial Court ought to have seen that Ex.P.1 cheque dated 6.1.2002 was admittedly issued for a legally enforceable debt and once that was dishonoured and not paid and inspite of receiving the legal notice, admittedly, the Accused is liable for punishment for the offence made out under Section 138 of the N.I. Act for not able to discharge the burden lies on him to rebut the presumption or onus and that the trial Court should have seen that even the Accused, as D.W.1, came to the witness box and admitted about the complainant subscribing two chits and liable to pay Rs.98,000/- and that Ex.P.1 cheque, dated 6.1.2002 for Rs.64,744/- admittedly issued, even pleaded by creating Ex.D.6 receipt dated 18.1.2002, as if Rs.50,000/- cash paid on 18.1.2002, it is unknown as to why the so called cash payment made and why not fully paid with a little balance left unpaid and even later not even taken back Ex.P.1 cheque on payment of amount and that itself sufficient to prosecute the Accused, however, the trial Court went wrong in acquitting the Accused and hence sought to set aside the acquittal judgment of the trial Court and convict the accused by allowing the appeal.

(3.) Whereas, it is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent/Accused that the trial Court was right in coming to a just conclusion by placing reliance on Exs.D.6 and D.7 receipts and for this Court, while sitting in appeal, there is nothing to interfere to reverse said acquittal judgment of the trial Court and sought for dismissal of the appeal.