(1.) The facts giving rise to the reference before the Full Bench in the writ appeal may be stated in nutshell as follows:
(2.) Appellant's writ petition questioning the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Peddapuram dated 30-7-2004 dismissing his appeal filed under Rule 9(6) of the Rules framed under A.P. Panchayat Raj Act,1994 (for short "the Act") by G.O. Ms. No.755 Panchayat Raj dated 30-11-1994 and as amended by G.O.Ms.No.279 dated 19-5-1995 against rejection of his nomination for by-election of Ward No.3 of Peddanapalli Gram Panchayat, Yeleswaram Mandal, East Godavari District was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by placing reliance upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in K. Ratnulu v. Collector and District Election Authority and others, 2001 (4) ALT 389 (DB), and two others decisions, namely, Ch. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, 2002 (2) ALT 655 and V.Narayana v. Election Officer, Alwal Municipality and others, 2000 (3) ALT 617, holding that the only remedy available to the appellant is to raise an election dispute under Section 233 of the Act.
(3.) At the time of admission of the appeal before the Division Bench, the appellant relied upon the observation of the Supreme Court in Umesh Shivappa Ambi v. Angadi Shankara Basappa and others,\999 (1) ALD (SCSN) 24 = 1998 (4) SCC 529 = AIR 1999 SC 1566, by contending that High Court will not ordinarily interfere with the elections in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy available in relation to election disputes. Since it was not an ordinary situation where the appellant ought to have been relegated to the ordinary remedy, which would take its own course and time when rejection of the nomination can be demonstrated without any further proof and grounds on which it was rejected are perverse and passed for extraneous considerations, the High Court can interfere by exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The said submission was favoured by the Division Bench and the matter was referred to the Full Bench. The precise question on which reference is made is contained in the order dated 10-8-2004, which reads as under: "We are of the view that there is a prima facie case in favour of the appellant and so far as the exercise of extraordinary powers of this Court are concerned, the same cannot be thwarted. The restrictions imposed for exercise of the powers are self imposed restrictions by the Courts and when there is equally efficacious remedy available, the availability of adequate statutory remedy cannot be a bar and accordingly we are of the view that the decision relied upon by the learned Single Judge of this Court in K.Ramulu's case (supra) would require reconsideration that in a given facts and circumstances of the case, whether it will be permissible for this Court to exercise the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and on this question, we make a reference to Full Bench."