POTHINENI VENKATESWARLU Vs. BODEMPUDI KOTAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondent in these civil revision petitions filed O.S. No. 35 of 1982 on the file of the learned Principal District Munsif at Addanki against the petitioner for recovery of an amount said to be due on a pronote. At the stage when the matter was posted for arguments, the petitioner herein filed I.A. No. 359 of 1989 under S. 151, C.P.C. to reopen the suit to enable him to take the plea that under the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Indebtedness (Relief) Act, 1987 (A.P. Act 45 of 1987), hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', the suit had abated as he was a 'small farmer' by amending the written statement, and also I.A., No. 360 of 1989 under O.6, R. 17 read with Ss.94 and 151, C.P.C. for amendment of the written statement by adding para 6(a) as follows:-- "Since this defendant is a small farmer the suit debt even if true has abated in view of the provisions of Act 45/1987. Hence the suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground as well." The learned Principal District Munsif by his order dated 29-6-1989 dismissed I.A. No. 359 of 1989 on the ground that the petitioner had come up with the application after the trial was over and the matter was posted for arguments and that the Act came into force on 1-1-1988 itself and that there was no explanation forthcoming from the petitioner for not taking the plea of small farmer earlier. Consequently he also dismissed I.A. No. 360 of 1989 by a separate order dated 29-6-1989. C.R.P. Nos. 118 and 2949 of 1991 are preferred by the petitioner against the orders of the learned Principal District Munsif in I.A. No. 359 and 360 of 1989 respectively.

(2.) After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the respondent, I am of the view that these C.R.Ps. have to be allowed. The Act is a beneficial piece of legislation for the purpose of alleviating the lot of certain categories of debtors and Sec. 2 of the Act declares that it is for giving effect to the policy under Article 46 of the Constitution i.e., promoting the economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and to protect them from all forms of exploitation and social injustice. Subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything in certain enactments, "with effect on and from the commencement of this Act, every debt borrowed or incurred during the period between the 2 9/12/1976 and the date of such commencement including interest, if any, owing to any creditor by an agricultural labourers, a rural artisan or a small farmer shall be deemed to be wholly discharged". Sub-section (2) of S. 3 of the Act is as follows:-- "(2)(a). No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or other proceeding against the debtor for the recovery of any amount of the debt, including interest, if any, which is deemed to be discharged under sub-sec. (1); Provided that where any suit or other proceeding is instituted jointly against the debtor and any other person, nothing in this sub-section shall apply to the maintainability of such suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to such other person. (b) All suits and other proceedings including appeals, revisions, attachments or execution proceeding pending at the commencement of this Act, against any debtor for the recovery of any such debt, including interest, if any shall abate; Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to the sale, in respect of any such debt, of- (i) any movable property held and concluded before commencement of this Act; (ii) any immovable property confirmed before such commencement. (c) Every debtor undergoing detention in a civil prison in execution of any decree for money passed against him by a Civil Court in respect of any such debt, including interest if any, shall be released. (3)(a). Every movable property pledged by a debtor whose debt is deemed to be discharged under sub-sec. (1), shall stand released in favour of such debtor and the creditor shall be bound to deliver the same to the debtor forthwith. (b) Every mortgage executed by such debtor in favour of the creditor shall stand redeemed and the mortgaged property shall be released in favour of such debtor." In view of this provision, it is the bounden duty of the Court to entertain the defence set up by the debtor on the basis that he is a small farmer at any time before the suit is disposed of. There is no time limit imposed by the Act for raising such a defence in a pending suit, On the other hand, Clause (b) of sub-sec. (2) of S.3 extracted above, categorically provides that alt suits etc., pending at the commencement of the Act shall abate. It is unfortunate that the learned Principal District Munsif has not looked into these provisions of the Act. I am therefore, satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to set up the defence under the Act even if the trial is closed.

(3.) The learned Principal District Munsif has rejected the applications on the ground that they could have been filed earlier and also by examining the merits. Enquiring into the merits of the proposed amendments arises if and when the amendments are permitted and not before. In Chintaparthi Venkataramana Reddy v. Nallam Rajamma, AIR 1988 AP 40, this Court has held that the Court has no power to consider the merits of the proposed amendment at the stage of the consideration of the question whether the amendment should be allowed and that R. 17, O. VI confers a wide discretion upon the Courts to allow the amendment of the pleadings at any stage of the proceedings and even after the case has been adjourned for arguments. In M/S. Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, AIR 1978 SC 484, the Supreme Court observed as follows (at page 485) :-- "Procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. Provisions relating to pleadings in civil cases are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met, to enable Courts to determine what is really at issue between parties, and to prevent deviations from the course which litigation on particular causes of action must take." In that case, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and allowed the amendment even though the application for amendment was filed by the plaintiff one year after the suit was instituted and the reason given was inadvertent omission of certain material facts in the plaint i.e., the failure to mention that the plaintiff-firm had been actually dissolved prior to the institution of the suit. The trial Court refused to allow the amendment on the ground that it amounted to introduction of a new cause of action. The High Court rejected the plaintiffs revision petition. The Supreme Court referred to its earlier judgment in Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon, AIR 1969 SC 1267 and the following passage therein (at page 1269):-- "Rules of procedure are intended to be a hand made to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The Court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for by an order of costs. However negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and however, late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side." In the present case, the learned Principal District Munsif himself observed that the Act came into force on 1-1-1988. Therefore amendment of the written statement arose only thereafter. The present applications were filed on 31-3-1989 i.e., just about an year after the Act was brought into force. Therefore, the fact that the suit is of 1982, that issues were framed and the suit was posted for trial to 7-7-1983, and that the trial began on 6-4-1987, and that an I. A. was filed by the defendant in 1987 itself for sending the suit document to an expert are not relevant in considering whether the amendment should be allowed or not. It cannot be disputed that the plea available to the defendant under the Act was not available to him prior to the coming into force of the Act. Inadvertence or negligence of the party in not promptly seeking amendment of the written statement cannot be said to have caused any prejudice to the plaintiff on the facts and circumstances of the present case. I am therefore satisfied that the learned Principal District Munsif has acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in rejecting the applications of the petitioner herein. On the facts of the present case this is quite apparent because the amendment relates to a plea based on the benefit claimed under a legislation seeking to implement the Directive Principle under Art. 46 i.e., for promoting the economic interests of certain weaker sections of the people and for protecting them from exploitation. When the statute dictates "no Civil Court shall entertain any suit" and "all suits and other proceedings.... pending.... shall abate" it becomes the duty of the Civil Court to allow as a rule amendments of the pleadings so as to enable the parties for whose benefit the legislation is intended to take the plea made available to them and not to reject them merely on the ground that there is some delay in seeking the amendments.