NARINDI MAHALAKSHMAIAH Vs. KOMATI BASAVAMRNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Hindu woman's estate and Hindu widow's limited estate are the legacies of Hindu Sastric Law. The doctrine of surrender by the Hindu widow though found expression in Dayabaga Law propounded by Jesmuthavahana or to be inherent in the doctrine of widow's estate, essentially has its evolution from judical dicta based on jurisprudential principles However, care has been taken that the maintenance of the widow, as an essential postulate of Hindu Law, has been sustained by preserving a reasonable provision to the widow at or about the time of surrender from the estate of her husband for her maintenance for life, With the advent of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short, "the Act") these doctrines are now rslics of the past converging conflagration to their continuance. After heralding the Constitution and assurance of equality it is found to be imperative to bring revolutionary change of equality between both the sexes in the law of inheritance and intestate succession in the Hindu Law. Therefore, while codifying the Hindu Law, far-reaching changes were intended from the operation of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act conferring absolute title in the property possessed by the Hindu female as owner thereof and the explanation thereto has been couched in widast terms bringing within its fold any properties acquired by her through diverse sources. However sub-section (2) thereof engrafted ''restricted estate" in respect of the properties acquired under specified circumstances enumerated thereunder. The doctrines above referred, to have their perpetration found repeated assertions from the "restricted estate" in subsection (2) as garb thereof. The egalitarian approach adopted by the Supreme Court paved way to cut down their sweep by construing sub-section (2) as a proviso or an exception to subsection (1) of Section 14, to that the efficacy of the absolute title conferred under subsection (1) could not be eroded; to make economic equality by Hindu female in inheritance meaningful and amelioration of their economic status a reality. The rivai claims between the absolute rights under sub-section (1) and the restricted estate under subsection (2) of Section 14 is the core of the contention in this appeal too.

(2.) To consider their ambit and applicability shorn of the irrelevant, the essential facts are stated thus: The appellants defendants 1 and 2 are purchasers under Ex.B-1 a sale deed dated March 2, 1966 from one Bethineni Laxmidevamma. The first respondent claims to be an agreement holder to purchase the same lands under Ex.A-2 dated August 31, 1976 and under Ex.A-3 datrd October 15, 1976 executed by respondents 2, 3 and 4, and 5 respectively. One Bethineni Kotaiah had four sons, by names, Peda Subbaiah, China Subbaiah, Krishnaiah and Venkaiah. They were members of the Hindu joint family In the year 1908, they partitioned their joint family assets and liabilities with metes and bounds and were in enjoyment thereof. China Subbaiah died intestate in the year 1910. Laxmidevamma, his young widow succeeded him as a sole heir as a limited holder for life China Subbaiah's other brothers were the only nearest reversioners. On December 4, 1914, there was an arrangement inter se between Laxmidevamma and her brothers-in-law. Thereunder, Laxmidevamma surrendered her entire limited estate to her brothers-in-law and claimed maintenance for her life and an open site to construct a house to live in it was agreed to by her brothers in law. They executed a registered maintenance deed Ex.A-1 dated December 4, 1914 and she was given Ac.3-00 of dry land with a restriction to enjoy the usufruct thereunder by leasing out or personal cultivation with no right to alienation and on her demise the property shall revert back to her brothers-in-law.

(3.) In Ex.A-1 it is recited that she was given possession of the Ac.3-00 under that document. But in the reply notice Ex A-23 dated May 16, 1966 got issued by Laxmidevamma to a notice Ex. B-21 dated May 6, 1966 of the respondents, she asserted that the property in her possession and enjoyment was part of the property fell to her husband's share. The fact remains that tha property continued to ba in her possession on the date on which the Act cams into force and she continued to enjoy the same. On February 3, 1966 she sold the property under Ex.B-1 to the appellants for consideration asserting her absolute rights by operation of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. The assertions and counter assertions in the notices just referred, became an off-shoot for the present suit for declaration of title to and possession of and was granted by the trial Court. Hence this appeal.