KARUMURI SEETHARAMAYYA Vs. PATCHA PERAIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The applicability of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 falls for determination in this second appeal. The 1st defendant, who is the appellant, is the 3rd wife of one K. Brahmiah, who died in December 1943. The 2nd plaintiff is the daughter of said Brahmiah by the first wife and the 1st plaintiff is her husband. They filed the suit for a declaration that the appellant 1st defendant has only a life interest in the suit property and that the sale by her under Ex. A-2 to the 2nd defendant is not binding beyond her lifetime. The contention of the first defendant is that under the terms of a compromise entered into between herself and the 1st plaintiff in O. S. No. 319 of 1944 on the file of the District Munsifs Court, Narsaraopeta, dated 30-3-1945 (Ex. A-5), her right to a limited estate was recognised, that as such Section 14(1) of the Act becomes applicable and she gets an absolute interest in the property and consequently her sale in favour of the 2nd defendant was valid. It appears that immediately after the death of K. Brahmiah, a suit was filed by the 1st plaintiff, the son-in-law, in O.S. No. 319 of 1944 alleging that he was the illatom son-in-law, that as such he was entitled to the entire properties of late Brahmiah to the exclusion of the widow and consequently prayed for a declaration of his title and possession of the suit properties. The 1st defendant denied that there was any illatom adoption, and pleaded that she was entitled to acs. 4-00 cts. of land which was sold to her by her husband in his lifetime and that she was entitled to the limited rights as the heir of her husband. The suit was compromised. Ex. A-5 was filed in which the 1st plaintiff gave up all his claims as illatom son-in-law and other pleadings, and reciting that his wife. Thirupatamma, the daughter of late Brahmiah has been put in possession of acs. 4-00 of land that was given by late Brahmiah and which is the southern portion of items 3, 4 and 5 of the plaint schedule, that the said Tirupathamma also be paid by the 1st defendant-appellant herein a sum of Rs. 150.00 which was owed to her by her father, that the remaining portion of the land of Brahmiah in D. Nos. 186/1, 186/2 and 173 which was ac. 1-50 cents (within the boundaries specified therein) be sold by the 1st defendant-appellant herein to discharge the debts contracted by her husband and the debts mentioned by the defendant in the answer, that the plaintiff or his wife should not in future during lifetime of the defendant, litigate in any manner or claim for more in the property of Brahmaiah, that the defendant shall enjoy the property sold to her by late Brahmiah on 11-2-1943 under registered sale deed as absolute property and the remaining properties the defendant shall enjoy as life estate and the parties should bear their own costs. It is the interpretation of the terms of this decree that has given rise to different judgments, the trial Court holding that the appellant did not acquire any property under this decree within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the first appellate Court holding otherwise.

(2.) The learned advocate for the appellant. Sri P. Ramachandra Reddy contends that the words life estate were used, rather loosely in the compromise decree by the pleaders clerk to connote a limited estate which the widow would be entitled to under the Hindu Law and consequently if Section 14 read in this way, the appellant does not acquire any property within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 14. It would be necessary to understand the operation of Sub-section (1) whereunder a widow would have her limited rights enlarged to those of absolute rights. In support of his contention he has cited several decisions to which reference will be made presently hereafter. Sri Venkata Subba Rao, learned advocate for the respondents, on the other hand submits that the first appellate Court on the evidence has held that the intention of the parties was to create a life interest and not a limited interest. He further contends that where the language of a document is clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to it and that where there is ambiguity evidence can be adduced to determine the intention of the parties. Consequently he submits that whether by reading the document as such or holding that it is ambiguous and treating the evidence in the case to warrant the intention of the parties, it is clear that the widow acquired properties under the decree because it is not a limited estate that she acquired but a life-estate.

(3.) Before examining these contentions it is necessary to read the provisions of Section 1 which are as under: