KRISHNA SWAMY Vs. SRI M.T. KRISHNABABU, I.A.S., COMMISSIONER, GREATER HYDERABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (GHMC) AND SRI B. SAMBOB I.A.S., SECRETARY, MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD Sri N. Naveen Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Dr. Y. Padmavathi, learned standing counsel for the 1st respondent. The alleged non -compliance with the common order in W.P. Nos. 13848 of 1999 and 16677 of 1999, dated 17 -07 -2007 is the subject of the present contempt case. In the said order, this Court directed the petitioner to give a fresh application to the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad within a period of four weeks from then seeking to fix the compensation in accordance with law, on receipt of which the Corporation may negotiate with the petitioner and fix the compensation within a period of four weeks thereafter. Further consequential directions were also given for payment of the compensation, if arrived at on mutual agreement or initiation of land acquisition proceedings by the Corporation, in the event of failure to arrive at a consensus. The petitioner claims that notwithstanding the said directions, the Corporation did not act on the representations submitted by him since the orders. Though he gave an application as directed by this Court on 17 -08 -2007 itself, neither negotiations were initiated nor steps for acquiring the land were taken in spite of repeated representations so made. While narrating the sequence of events in detail, the petitioner desired the Commissioner of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation and the Secretary of Municipal Administration Department, Government of A.P. to be (sic).

(2.) WHEN the question of limitation involved in filing the case was raised during the hearing, Sri N. Naveen Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sabirabi v. B. Obula Reddy and others wherein following the decision in Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur, (AIR 1992 SC 902), this Court held that the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court under Articles 129 and 215 cannot be curtailed by anything in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Division Bench opined that the limitation for initiation of contempt case starts from the date of knowledge of alleged violation of the order of the contempt Court and such initiation of contempt proceedings includes issuing of notice by this Court calling upon the contemnors to show cause. With reference to the facts of the present case, the alleged violation of the order of this Court since the passing of the order and since the submission of the application by the petitioner on 17 -08 -2007 was within the knowledge of the petitioner throughout and therefore, there is no circumstance that postpones the commencement of the computation of the period of limitation for filing the contempt case since the expiry of the time fixed by this Court for performance after the submission of an application by the petitioner within the period fixed by this Court.