J R RAMESH KUMAR Vs. N PRABHAKAR RAO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard Sri P. Srinivas, learned counsel representing the revision petitioner and Sri Shivram Prasad, learned counsel representing the respondent.

(2.) The present Civil Revision Petition is taken up for hearing by virtue of an order of remand made by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 7457 of 2001, dated 02-11-2001. In fact, C.R.P.No. 5093 of 1996, dated 5-9-2000 was allowed by this court with costs on the ground of bonafide requirement to the landlord holding that the Tribunals below had not appreciated the concept of bonafide requirement in proper perspective. It is brought to my notice that C.M.P.No. 8458 of 1998 in C.R.P.No. 5093 of 1996 was filed for receiving documents filed along with that petition as additional evidence and C.M.P.No. 8459 of 1998 in C.R.P.No. 5093 of 1996 was filed to amend the original rent case by adding para 5(a). These applications were, in fact opposed by the tenant. As can be seen from the order made in C.R.P. No. 5093 of 1996 and also the order of remand made by the Apex Court, none of the parties had touched the C.M.Ps. and consequently no findings had been recorded in this regard. Both the counsel had advanced elaborate submissions on this a'spect. The stand taken by the counsel representing the revision petitioner is that though there is a vague denial relating to the change of business, in the latter paras there is specific admission and in the light of the same it should be taken as admission made by the tenant and this ground also may be taken into consideration. The learned counsel also submitted that the learned judge while deciding C.R.P.No. 5093 of 1996 obviously thought it fit to allow revision petition on the ground of bonafide personal requirement only and hence the subsequent events were left untouched.

(3.) Per contra, Sri Shivram Prasad, the learned counsel representing the tenant contended that the parties were conscious of the pendency of these applications in the revision, But, when the contentions were not advanced in this regard, it should be taken that these grounds raised as subsequent events had been given up and hence the said ground, if any, should not be raised again, when the specific remand order was made by the Apex Court limiting the order of remand only to the ground of bona fide personal requirement. The counsel also had explained the scope and ambit of subsequent events and made elaborate submissions relating to the fact that at the best this is a new cause of action and there is no point in permitting the parties to amend the pleading or to receive additional evidence at this stage on the ground that these facts fall under subsequent events. The counsel also no doubt pointed out the limitations of the revisional court in receiving additional evidence at the revisional stage.