MADALA VENKAIAH DIED Vs. K KRISHNA MURTHY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The legal representatives of the unsuccessful tenant in both the Tribunals below had preferred the civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Respondents 1 to 4 herein filed ATC No.l6 of 1993 on the file of Special Officer, Tenancy Tribunal cum-II Additional Munsif Magistrate, Ongole, under Section 13(a) of the A.P. (A.A) Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as Act in short) praying for eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule land. On the respective pleadings of the parties, the Tenancy Tribunal after recording the evidence of P.W.I and P.W.2 and R.W.I and R.W.2 and also marking Exs.A-1 and A-2 and Exs.B-1 to B-8, had ultimately arrived at a conclusion that there is no evidence that the petitioners in the said ATC required the land for personal cultivation and though there is a pleading, there is no evidence and hence, the said ground was not considered. But, however, the said Tribunal had recorded a finding that the respondent in the said ATC-Tenant had committed default for the year 1979-80 and had ordered eviction. Aggrieved by the same, the tenant filed ATA No.15 of 1997 on the file of the District Judge, Ongole- Appellate Tribunal and during the pendency of the said ATA No.15 of 1997, the tenant died and the Appellants 2 to 4 were added as the Legal Representatives of the deceased- 1st appellant-tenant as per orders in LA. No.482 of 2000 dated 2-11-2001. The learned District Judge-Appellate Tribunal also had confirmed the order of the Primary Tribunal by dismissing the appeal and aggrieved by the same the legal representatives of the deceased-tenant had preferred the present civil revision petition.

(2.) Sri O. Manohar Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the revision petitioners, had submitted that as far as default relating to the year 1979-1980 is concerned, both the Tribunals below had recorded concurrent findings. But, however, the very fact that Respondents 1 to 4 herein had approached the Special Officer-Tenancy Tribunal after a long lapse of time would go to show that the stand taken by them relating to the default for the year 1979-80 cannot be believed at all. The learned Counsel also had further explained the conduct of the parties subsequent to the year 1979-1980. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the findings recorded both by the Primary Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal and had commented that the approach adopted by both the Tribunals is definitely erroneous. The Counsel also maintains that when there were no arrears at all as on the date of filing of the eviction petition, the said petition itself is not maintainable under Section 13 of the Act. The learned Counsel incidentally had drawn the attention of this Court to Section 12 of the Act relating to personal cultivation. The learned Counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to the relevant paras in A. Abbayi v. R. Choultry, AIR 1974 AP 139 and also Vinukonda Venkata Ramana and others v. Mootha Venkateswara Rao and others, 2001 (6) ALD 27 = 2001 (5) ALT 479.

(3.) Per contra, Sri Raja Sekhar, the learned Counsel representing Respondents 1 to 4, had drawn the attention of this Court to the relevant findings recorded by both the Tribunals and inasmuch as concurrent finding had been recorded relating to the default for the year 1979-80, the same cannot be disturbed, since it being a finding of fact. The learned Counsel further submitted that the plea of waiver was never raised at all and in fact the pleading is totally different from proof and the burden of proof cast on the tenant, had not been discharged by the tenant at all and hence, the Tribunals below had arrived at the correct conclusion in ordering eviction of the tenants. The Counsel also would maintain that the mere fact that the Respondents 1 to 4. had approached the Tenancy Tribunal after some lapse of time that by itself cannot be a ground to negative the relief. Even, otherwise, the bar of time to recover rent is something different and the question of limitation would not be operative for the purpose of initiating action for eviction under the provisions of the Act.