MOHAMMAD NAZAR JANI Vs. SYED PEERULLA HUSSAIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) An application was filed before the Trial Court under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code seeking adjournment of O.P. No.3 of 2001 till a regular' Principal Junior Civil Judge was posted. It appears that election of the petitioner as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Chandole has been challenged by way of O.P. No.3 of 2001 which was pending before the Election Tribunal-Principal Junior Civil Judge, Bapatla. The post of Principal Junior Civil Judge became vacant and I-Addl. Junior Civil Judge, Bapatla was given full additional charge of the Principal Junior Civil Judge who proceeded with the trial. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that since the jurisdiction has been conferred by the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act on the Principal Junior Civil Judge and he was a persona designata, therefore the I-Addl. Junior Civil Judge could not exercise the jurisdiction. He relies on the Rules framed under the A.P. Panchayat Raj (Election Tribunals in respect of Gram Panchayats, Mandal Parishads and Zilla Parishads) Rules, 1995 (for short "the Rules"). In Rule l(3)(iii) the District Munsiff has been defined:

(2.) The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that since the jurisdiction has been conferred as an Election Tribunal only on the Prl. District Munsiff where there are more than one District Munsiffs, therefore the Additional District Munsiff could not exercise the jurisdiction of an Election Tribunal. The argument appears to be fallacious. The "District Munisff' has been defined as a District Munsiff appointed under the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972. The I-Add1. District Munsiff is a District Munsiff appointed under the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972. The purpose of conferring jurisdiction of Election Tribunal on the Pr1. District Munsiff where there are more than one District Munsiff is only to avoid any clash of power between different District Munsiffs. Where there is only one District Munsiff and the territorial jurisdiction over the Gram Panchayat in respect of which election of the members is challenged, the jurisdiction lies with the said District Munsilf, but when there are many District Munsiffs, the jurisdiction has been conferred on the Prl. District Munsif, that is only to avoid any misunderstanding or confusion as to which of the District Munsiffs would exercise the jurisdiction. Since the Prl. District Munsilf was transferred and the post had fallen vacant, the High Court issued a notification under the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 conferring the jurisdiction of Prl. District Munsiff on the I-Add. District Munsiff (I-Addl. Junior Civil Judge). Therefore all the powers which are available under these Rules to the Prl. District Munsiff become available to the I-Addl. District Munsiff as well. In my view, the I-Addl. District Munsiff did not lack jurisdiction as has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Reliance can be placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 606. In this judgment Section 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was interpreted by the Supreme Court which is as under: "Section 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, at the relevant time, provided as follows: "10(1). In every district outside the presidency- towns the Provincial Government shall appoint a Magistrate of the first class, who shall be called the District Magistrate. (2) The Provincial Government may appoint any Magistrate of the first class to be an Additional District Magistrate and such Additional District Magistrate shall have all or any of the powers of a District Magistrate under this Code or under any other law for the time being in force, as the Provincial Government may direct." The Notification, which was issued about Mr. Brijpal Singh Seth and which has been quoted already, invested him with all the powers of the District Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as under any other law for the time being in force. He was thus competent to deal with an application under the Act for permission to file a civil suit without special authorization from the District Magistrate. Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the definition of "District Magistrate" clearly showed that in addition to the District Magistrate, only an officer specially authorized by him could act under the Eviction Act, and he referred to subsection (2) of Section 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provided; "It extends to the whole of British India; but, in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing herein contained shall affect any special or local law now in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force.........."

(3.) Then the Supreme Court noted the argument which was made before it. "The argument was that the special jurisdiction created by the Eviction Act was not affected by Section 10(2) of the Code, in view of the provisions of this sub-section. The argument overlooks the words "in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary", and because there is in the Code of Criminal Procedure such a provision in Section 10(2), sub-section (2) of Section 1 is excluded, and an Additional District Magistrate must be regarded as possessing the powers under any other law including the Eviction Act." In para-9 the Supreme Court laid down: