SATYANARAYANA SPUN PIPE COMPANY Vs. N PADMAVATHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Second Appeal was filed against the judgment and decree, dated 15-7-1994, and passed by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Kakinada in A.S.No.151 of 1993. The Respondent herein filed O.S.No.762 of 1979 on the file of the I Additional District Munsif, Kakinada against the Appellant - Satyanarayana Spun Pipe Company, represented by its Managing Partner - herein for its eviction from the plaint schedule premises and also for future mesne profits at Rs.300/- per month till the date of delivery. On the respective pleadings of the parties, the issues and additional issue were settled. On behalf of the Respondent-Plaintiff, P.W.1, the husband of the Respondent-Plaintiff was examined and Exs.A.1 to A.7 were marked. On behalf of the Appellant-Defendant, D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined. Exs.X.1 and X.2 were marked. The Court of first instance i.e. the I Additional District Munsif, Kakinada, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, arrived at the conclusion that the Respondent-Plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for and decreed the suit granting three months time to the Appellant-Defendant to vacate the suit schedule premises and directing the Appellant-Defendant to pay balance amount of damages after deducting the amount already paid by him to the Respondent-Plaintiff from Rs.33,290/- within three months from that date on payment of requisite court fee payable by the Respondent-Plaintiff on the aforementioned amount. The unsuccessful Appellant-Defendant aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the I Additional District Munsif, Kakinada preferred A.S.No.151 of 1993 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Kakinada. The appellate Court; i.e. the Principal Subordinate Judge, Kakinada, by its judgment and decree, dated 15-7-1994, dismissed the said A.S.No.151 of 1993 without costs confirming the judgment and decree of the Court of first instance. Aggrieved by the same, the unsuccessful Defendant filed this Second Appeal.

(2.) Sri T. Veerabhadrayya, learned counsel representing the Appellant-Defendant, had drawn my attention to ground No.16 (a) to (c) of the grounds of this Second Appeal and contended that the Courts below totally erred in recording a finding that the lease is for 5 years only, since the Courts below did not take into consideration the broad probabilities and the surrounding circumstances. The learned counsel for the Appellat-Defendant had further maintained that a quit notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short "the T.P. Act") is not in accordance with law and even otherwise it cannot be said that such notice is not necessary by efflux of time. The learned counsel for the Appellant-Defendant also maintained that inasmuch as the Respondent-Plaintiff received the rents after receiving Ex.A.2 notice, the Appellant-Defendant is definitely a tenant holding over. The learned counsel for the Appellant-Defendant in fact had taken me through the findings which were recorded by the Court of first instance and also the appellate Court and had pointed out that in view of non-examination of the Respondent-Plaintiff the approach of the Courts below in recording such findings definitely cannot be said to be in accordance with law.

(3.) Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy, learned counsel for the Respondent-Plaintiff, had made the following submissions and took me through the recitals of Ex.A.1 and contended that by virtue of efflux of time as per Section 111 of the T.P. Act no notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act is necessary. The learned counsel for the Respondent-Plaintiff further maintained that in fact a notice was issued and both the Courts below on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence came to the conclusion that the Respondent-Plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs as prayed for. The learned counsel for the Respondent-Plaintiff repealing the contention relating to the non-examination of the Respondent-Plaintiff had submitted that P.W.1 is no other than the husband of the Respondent-Plaintiff having knowledge about all the facts and circumstances and in view of Section 120 of the Indian Evidence Act (for short "the Evidence Act"), the husband is definitely a competent witness and hence the same cannot be in any way faulted.