CHAMUDUGUNTA RAGHAVA REDDY Vs. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ petition has been filed seeking for issuance of a writ of Mandamus declaring the communication sent by the respondent in Rc. B-1 180/86 dated 11-4-1989 as illegal and without jurisdiction and directing the respondent to refer the matter to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (here in after referred to as 'the Act') for determination of correct market value of the acquired land of 2 acres comprising in Sy.Nos.397 and 402 of Venkannapalem village, Thotapalli Gudur Mandal, Nellore District. The above land was acquired by invoking the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published in the Gazette on 8-8-1986. Sometime later, it seems, that a draft declaration under Section 6 of the Act was also published in the gazette. It is not known as to whether any urgency clause was invoked. But, it is apparent out of the records that the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was not dispensed with. It is not known as to why the compensation conforming to 80% of the market value was paid by the respondent at all in the absence of invocation of urgency clause. The payment of 80% of the compensation arises only when the urgency clause as contained under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 17 is invoked and for that reason, Section 17(3-A) of the Act, which was inserted by an amendment Act No.68 of 1984, warrants the payment of 80% of the compensation which is subject to adjustment as contemplated under Section 17(3-B) there of. Not only 80% of the compensation was paid by the respondent and received by the petitioners on 28-3-1987, the further amount of 20% was also paid by the respondent to the petitioners on 23-1-1988. It is admitted that both these amounts of 80% and 20% received on 28-3-1987 and 23-1-1988 respectively by the petitioners were under protest; and in ordinary course, if the application as stated by the petitioners was filed on 10-4-1987 seeking a reference under Section 18 of the Act, the respondent was liable to refer the same to the Civil Court for determination of proper compensation. To the notice issued on behalf of the petitioners seeking reference under Section 18 of the Act, the respondent had replied through the impugned proceedings that since no application was filed under Section 18 of the Act, the question of reference to the Civil Court did not arise. The assertion of the petitioners that they made an application for reference under Section 18 of the Act on 10-4-1987 and the reply of the respondent that no such application was filed pre-supposes that the award has been passed. The counter filed by the respondent also states that after award has been passed, no application under Section 18 of the Act was filed by the petitioners. But, strangely, the records produced before me by Mr. Chandraiah, the learned Government Pleader, proves the facts otherwise. As I could see from the records, every other legal formality under the Act was complied with since passing of the Award. I am astonished to know that the amount has been paid even without passing the award which is the basic thing to be performed by the Land Acquisition Officer under the provisions of the Act. There is no choice for the respondent either to pass the award or not. After issuing the notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act and after receiving the claims of the petitioners, it was incumbent upon the respondent to conduct enquiry and pass the award in accordance with Section 11 of the Act which reads as follows:

(2.) As could be seen from the mandatory language employed under the said statutory provision, it was incumbent upon the respondent to pass the award. But the respondent had grossly failed to do so which is a infraction of the mandatory provisions of the Act. Unless the award is passed by the respondent under Section 11 of the Act and communicated to the petitioners under Section 12(2) of the Act and question of filing an application under Section 18 of the Act seeking a reference and then consequential act of respondent referring the same to the Civil Court does not arise at all. Both the petitioners and the respondent were under an illusion that the award was passed when actually it was not in existence. This is yet another typical case of mis-handling the things by an inexperienced executive invested with the exercise of important functions under a statute dealing with civil rights of citizens. I am constrained to make this observation as but for the concession of Mr. Sreedhar Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioners that he is not insisting upon setting aside Section 4(1) notification inspite of the award having not been passed even after the expiry of the statutory period stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act, the Government would have ended up in paying the compensation as prevalent in the year 1992 or thereafter when a fresh notification under Section 4(1) of the Act would have to be issued, as the award, if not passed within two years of the draft declaration under Section 6 of the Act, automatically extinguishes the draft notification under Section 4(1) of the Act.

(3.) In the circumstances, the writ petition is disposed of with the following directions: