(1.) The Appellant, who is the original writ petitioner, is aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge dismissing her writ petition. The few relevant facts leading to this appeal are required to be noted at the outset to appreciate the grievance of (he appellant.
(2.) The notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act (for short 'the Act') was issued by the State of Andhra Pradesh on 13th September, 1979. The notification sought to acquire a total extent of Ac.8.02 cents comprised in S.Nos-133/lA, 135/1A, 136 and 137/1 of Manchala village, Mantralayam Mandal, Kurnool District, for the purpose of construction of bus stand by the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation'), which is the second respondent herein. Possession of the land was taken on 6th November, 1979 and award was passed on 31st August, 1980 determining the compensation. In the meantime, the third respondent herein filed Writ Petition No. 2704 of 1980 in respect of one acre of land in S.No. 136. Out of Ac.2.95 cents in S.No.136, which originally belonged to one Mallaiah, S/o. Laxmaiah, the third respondent purchased one acre for a sum of Rs.5,000/-. He filed the said writ petition contending that the acquisition is invalid, and sought forquashing of the notification under Section 4(l)of the Act. Now it must be stated at this stage that earlier the said third respondent had appeared before the Land Acquisition Authority and submitted that he had no objection to the land being acquired and his dispute was regarding quantum of compensation to be awarded to him for acquisition of his one acre of land in S.No. 136. It is not in dispute between the parties that this land is a pocket land situated in the midst of other land, which is sought to be acquired for the purpose of bus stand. When the Corporation found that a dispute with respect to this pocket land of one acre was taken to the High Court and was on the anvil, an arrangement of compromise was arrived at between the Corporation on the one hand and the third respondent on the other, as a result of which an agreement was entered into on 29th September, 1984 in the following terms:
(3.) Pursuant to the said agreement, the third respondent was given one acre from the southerr side of S.No. 133 / 1 A on his paying Rs. 5,750/- per acre, and in bargain the third respondent gave up his contention regarding acquisition of his one acre of land in S.No. 136;he also agreed to forego the excess compensation, which may be awarded for the acquisition of his land in S.No.136. It is not in dispute that this agreement has been acted upon. The third respondent withdrew his writ petition; award was passed for acquiring his one acre of land in S.No.136 and the third respondent was allotted one acre of land out of S.No,133/lA. It is thereafter that the present writ petitioner, who is the legal representative of the deceased tenant of the land, which was sought to be acquired outof S.No.133/lA, filed the writ petition contend ing that the transfer of one acre of land acquired out of S.No. l33 / lA by the Corporation in favour of the third respondent was patently illegal and contrary to Section 44-A of the Actread with Rule 8 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules')- It was submitted that when a land is acquired for a public purpose, it had to be strictly utilised for such purpose only, as the land acquisition proceedings represent exercise of power of eminent domain by the State. They cannot be bartered away, in order to gain profit, to persons like the third respondent, it was contended that part VII of the Land Acquisition Act was required to be followed strictly, as the acquisition was for the Corporation, which is a Company and as Section 44-A of the Act is part of Part VII, it had to be strictly followed. That has not been done. Hence it may be declared that the transfer of one acre of land out of the acquired land in S.No. 133 / 1 A in favour of the third respondent by the Corporation is null and void and inoperative in law.