ABDUL RAHEEM Vs. SRINIVASA DYEING WORKS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The sole tenant is the petitioner herein. The eviction petition was filed in the year 1972 on the grounds of wilful default in payment of rent and bona fide personal requirement. The learned Rent Controller holding that the ground of bonafide personal requirement was not established and that there is no wilful default in payment of rent, dismissed the eviction petition. On appeal, the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada who is the appellate authority held that the firm of which the minor is a partner, requires the premises bonafide for personal occupation and that there is also wilful default in payment of rent. He accordingly allowed the appeal and ordered eviction.

(2.) When the civil revision petition came up for hearing on an earlier occasion, K. Jayachandra Reddy, J. (as he then was) agreed with the appellate court holding that the premises is bona fide required f6r the occupation of the first landlord-firm (for short "the firm"). Though the learned Judge observed that there is no categorical finding with regard to the wilful default for the disputed months of December, 1971, January, 1972 and February, 1972, dismissed the Civil Revision Petition upholding the ground of bona fide personal requirement giving seven months' time to the tenant to vacate the premises.

(3.) Challenging that order in the revision, the tenant filed Civil Appeal No.2969 of 1982 in the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court by an order dated 24-7-1987 while setting aside the order of the High Court remitted the matter back to the High Court with a direction that the High Court will call for a finding from the learned Rent Controller as to whether the landlord requires the premises in question for bona fide personal requirement having regard to all aspects. The landlord sought a further direction from the Supreme Court by filing I.A.No.l of 1990 in Civil Appeal No.2969/1982. After hearing both sides, the Supreme Court directed this Court by an order dated 10th April, 1991 to consider the question of default either on the basis of the evidence already on record or after allowing the parties to let in additional evidence on the point. The Supreme Court also gave an option to this court to remit the case to the first appellate court for the aforesaid purpose.