KISHAN CHAND Vs. SAYEEDA KHATOON

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This rent revision by the tenant raises a sole but rather important question as to whether as to whether under sec. 110 of the T.P. Act if the instrument of lease is silent with regard to the commencement of the lease, the first day as per the implied commencement within the meaning of second limb of sec. 110 will have to be excluded in computing the time. Within which a notice to be given by landlord for the termination of tenancy.

(2.) The format of the case in brief is The lease agreement was entered into on 16/02/1971 a between the revisionist-tenant and the landlady-respondent in respect of the demised premises, H. No. 3-3-71/2. Kachiguda, hyderabad, on a monthly rent of Rs. 150.00 for a period of eleven months with a stipulation therein that the tenancy may be continued by the landlady after the expiry of eleven months on the same terms and conditions after the stipulated period the tenancy, however continued and came to be treated as a tenancy by holding over from month to month. After a decade the landlady gave a notice of termination under Ex. A-7 stating that the tenant has contravened the stipulation of the lease agreement by using the premises for running N. K. Cottage Industry which has materially impaired the value and damaged the premises. This notice was given on 20/10/1979 stating therein that the tenant shall vacate the premises by the mid-night of 15/ 16/12/1979.

(3.) The rent court, on the basis of the evidence, both documentary and oral held that though the tenant has not been in a position to establish that the premises have been let out for manufacturing purposes but however since the quite notice is not in conformity with the provisions enacted under sec. 110 T.P. Act, as the day of commencement for the purpose of reckoning the period of computation in regard to the notice will have to be excluded viz., 16/12/1979 the right to terminate by the landlady is defeated and thereby the eviction petition was dismissed. On appeal the rent Appellate Court, however allowed it holding sec 110 T.P. Act is not available to the tenant inasmuch as the second limb of that section explains by deeming provision, as to when the lease commences, but it does not provide for exclusion of any day in the process of computation of the period within which (notice) has to be issued. Secondly it held that even on the basis of the evidence the premises have been used much later to the letting out for the purpose of manufacturing lamps. It is the original intention of the parties that has to be gathered from the instrument. Admittedly, since at the initial stage when the premises any subsequent usage of it for manufacturing purposes would not render the premises. As one let for manufacturing purpose and therefore, six months notice need not be issued as contemplated under sec. 106 T.P. Act, hence this second appeal.