SHAIK SHAVALLI Vs. SECRETARY RTA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The four petitioners, some of Anantapur and others of Kurnool, have joined together and filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying that a writ of Mandamus may be issued compelling the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Anantapur and the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Kurnool to issue special permits to the petitioners under Section 63 (6) of the MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), enabling them to run their buses empty from Uravakonda and Meddikera and other places in Anantapur and Kurnool Districts upto some unspecified places in other States of Karnataka, Tamilnadu and Maharashtra to pick up passengers of those States contracted to be carried to places of tourism and pilgrimage as per the permits and to set down those passengers at the respective places where they are picked up and to come back to their respective places in Anantapur and Kurnool Districts empty.

(2.) Surely we have come to this pass where the litigants can ask under Article 226 of the Constitution for anything.

(3.) In support of this writ petition, no material facts had been stated that would disclose any cause of action, probably because the petitioners thought that they need disclose no cause for this action. This writ petition is clearly an example of an action without cause wh ch cannot exist in the world of legal action. The petitioners say in para 4 of the writ petition, ''I submit that the respondents, who were issuing the special permits from the beginning are refusing now to receive the applications for issue of such permits by stating orally that they will not issue special permits under Section 63 (6) of the Act if the vehicles are to go empty from the places in Anantapur and Kurnool Districts to any place in other States to pick up a party in other States to complete the journey and to set down it at the place where the party is picked up in other States and to come back emyty from that place to its place in Anantapur District." The writ petition did not state in any of its parts either the name or the identity of the officer who said so or the name or the identity of the person to whom it was said or when. The writ petition did not say that any application for the grant of special permits under Section 63 (6) of the Act had been made and if made to whom they were made, and what happened to such applications. This is clearly symptomatic of the falling standards of writ litigation. It is needless to say that failure to plead those material facts would amount in law to a serious failure on the part of the petitioners to state their cause of action. And without a cause of action being borne in some part of it though not on its forehead, no writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, as that Article stands today, can be entertained, for Article 226 Clause (2) does speak of "the cause of action wholly or in part (arising) for the exercise of such power". The implication of Article 226 is that for the exercise of powers by a High Court under Article 226 cause of action must have arisen. Whether the cause of action has arisen or not can only be known by pleadings. In the state of the pleading the petitioners made in the writ petition it should be taken that no cause of action was stated. The legal consequences of such a failure to plead a cause of action are no relief not even a declaratory relief can be granted by this Court. The petitioners ask for a writ of mandamus directing the transport authorities to grant them special permits as and when applied for. A special permit even so requires the name of the place and the names of the contracted parties to be stated. In other words, a special permit would require a statement of minimum details. As no such details were given in the writ petition no relief can be granted to the petitioners.