GUDURI VEERAIAH Vs. P AUDINARAYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision is filed against an order of the District Court refusing to condone the delay in presenting the appeal in the following circumstances.

(2.) The defendant-appellant filed a regular appeal to this Count against the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 107 of 1976 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Guntur on 13th June, 1978. The appellant valued the appeal at Rs. 15,000. The appeal was returned by the office of the Court to the Counsel for the appellant on 28th June, 1978, stating that in view of the valuation of the appeal at Rs. 15,000 this Court cannot entertain the appeal and it must be presented to the proper Court. The Counsel for the appellant sent the records through post and the same were received by the petitioner herein on 7th July, 1978. He presented the appeal to the District Court on 10th July, 1978, with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for excusing the delay. The Court) below rejected the said application stating that, the delay cannot be executed and at any rate the delay from 29th June, 1978 to 9th August, 1978, was not properly explained. Hence the revision.

(3.) It is interesting to note that section 14 of the Limitation Act does not in terms apply even under the new Limitation Act (XXXVI of 1963). Section 14 (1) of the Limitation Act directs that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, the time taken in prosecuting the proceedings in a wrong Court shall be excluded, Similarly sub-section (2) of section 4 marks the said principle applicable for applications and it is clear that the said section does not apply to appeals. Perhaps the Legislature, thought that the power given to the Court under section 5 is sufficient. Rut this question was examined by Courts and it is settled by the judgment of the Privy Council in Brij Inder Singh v. Kanshi Rani, which held that the circumstances contemplated in section 14 of the Limitation Act should ordinarily constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5. Lord Dunedin observe at page 106 that the rule embodied in section 14 was accepted by all High Courts as constituting sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 and their Lordships did not propose to interfere with that rule.