G RAMULU Vs. M NARASIMHULU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Revision Petition is filed under section 91 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The relevant facts are that the respondents herein filed an application under section 98 of the Act before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Adilabad, for eviction of the petitioner herein alleging that they had sold survey No.16 situated in Takli village to the extent of Acres 6-30 guntas to the petitioner herein under a private contract. The petitioner herein, although got possession of the land did not give to the respondents full consideration and as no permission was obtained under section 47 of the Act, the contract is invalid. They therefore claimed that the petitioner herein should be summarily evicted from the land.

(2.) The defence raised by the petitioner herein is that, he has purchased the land from the respondents and that he cannot be therefore evicted from the said land. He showed his willingness to perform his part of the contract. The Revenue Divisional Officer, after hearing the parties, directed eviction through his order, dated 21st March, 1960. Aggrieved by that decision, the petitioner went in appeal before the District Collector, Adilabad, who through his order, dated 24th June, 1960, dismissed the appeal. This revision petition is filed against the said order of the Collector. The principal contention of Mr. Kon dapi, the learned Advocate for the petitioner is that, the Revenue Divisional Officer has no jurisdiction to entertain any application for eviction as the dispute between the parties falls beyond the scope of the Act. Relying upon Sharfuddin v. Sama Telluga,1957 2 An. W.R. 478. he contends that the scheme disclosed by the provisions of the Act is to regulate the relationship between landholders and tenants and it does not affect the rights inter se between two persons setting up rights of ownership to a particular land or the dispute between the owner and a trespasser or a person other than a tenant. His contention is that under the scheme of the Act a landholder, who wants to take possession of the land from a tenant or a protected tenant, can proceed in the manner prescribed under the Act, that is, file an application before the Tahsildar, and to that extent if any question arises whether a particular tenant is a protected tenant, the exclusive jurisdiction to decide that question is also conferred on the Tahsildar. In such cases only the civil Court has no jurisdiction. But in all other cases where there is a dispute of title the matter should go to the civil Court. It is true that the abovesaid case was followed in Ganga Reddy v. Rukma Bai, 1958 A.L.T. 824. and also in Itikala Venkataramayya v. Kommu Guravayya, 1961 1 An. W.R. 120. What these cases decide is that, the scheme of the Act is to regulate the relationship between landholders and tenants and it does not affect the rights inter se between persons setting up rights to the ownership of a particular land, nor does it affect any dispute between an owner and a trespasser or a person other than a tenant. The soundness of this proposition as far as that branch of the Act is concerned cannot be disputed. It is clear that the jurisdiction which the Act creates is a special jurisdiction which to that extent takes away the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Courts. It is therefore right that whenever we are called upon to interpret any section of the Act relating to the jurisdiction of such a special Court, our interpretation should be strict, but wherever the Act specifically and in an unambiguous language confers a jurisdiction and provides a remedy it goes without saying that the remedy must be followed before the Court appointed for that purpose under the Act. The contention of Mr. Kondapi that the Act concerns itself with the regulation of relationship of landlord and tenant alone, cannot be accepted as correct. The Act is comprehensive in its scope and takes within its fold what is compendiously known as ' land reforms 'and not only what is called ' tenancy reforms ' . The term ' land reform' covers a variety of different policies. There are at least six basic principles which appears to have been kept in view while effecting the land reforms through the abovesaid Act. They are :

(3.) Releigh Barlowe observes that, from a pure technical standpoint, almost any programme that leads to change, presumably for the better, in the manner in which land is held or used, might be described as ' land reform' . But, he adds that its exact meaning often is associated with political goals and ideologies ; and whereas its meaning may seem narrow and restrictive in some cases, it may be stretched to cover exceedingly broad field of action in others, as implied in the Resolution of the Economic Social Council of the United Nations on Land Reform in September, 1951 (pages 174-175, Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 35, 1953, No. 1.). Looked at from this basic point of view it appears that, the land reform programmes which have assumed a place of special significance have two specific objects. The first is to remove such impediments to increase the agricultural production as arise from the agrarian structure inherited from the past. This would help to create conditions for evolving as speedily as possible an agricultural economy with high levels of efficiency and productivity. The second object appears to be to eliminate all elements of exploitation and social injustice within the agrarian system to provide security to the tiller of soil and assure equality of status and opportunity to all sections of the rural population.