(1.) This is an appeal against the Judgment of the City Civil Court, Hyderabad, dismissing E.P. No. 166/3 of 1956. In order to appreciate the issues that arise in this case it is useful to indicate the background of this litigation. The appellant obtained a decree against one Nawab Zia Yar Jung, whose legal representatives are the respondents, for Rs. 28,276 on 7th February, 1914. By putting that decree into execution on several occasions, the decree-holder realised a substantial portion of the decree. It is not necessary for us to follow the history of the several execution petitions for the purpose of this enquiry. Suffice it to say that, E.P. No. 209 of 1951, which has given rise to this appeal,was filed by the appellant for realisation of the balance of the decretal amount. After notice to the judgment-debtor, he pleaded that he being a jagirdar, was entitled to relief under the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act, 1952 (XII of 1952) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Thereupon, the execution petition was transferred by the City Civil Court to the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board. The jagirdar-debtor then filed an application on 1sth May, 1952 for settlment of his debts. During the pendency of this application, the Jagirdar died i.e., on 7th October, 1953. As no steps were taken either by the legal representatives of the debtor to come on record or by the decree-holder to bring them on record and as no action was taken under Order 22, Civil Procedure Code, the Board could not proceed with the application any further. In this view of the matter, the Board ordered that all proceedings in the case should be closed and all files and moneys returned to the concerned Courts and departments.
(2.) On receipt of the records by the City Civil Court, the decree-holder wanted to proceed with the execution petition. Once again, an objection was taken by the debtors that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to execute the decree and that it was only the Debt Settlement Board that could settle the debts. It must be mentioned here that when the matter went back to the trial Court, the legal representatives of the original debtor came on record and it is they that formulated the objection indicated above. Agreeing with this contention, the City Civil Court once again transferred the execution petition to the Debt Settlement Board. Curiously enough, the Debt Settlement Board, instead of taking up the matter under the relevant sections of the Act for settlement of the debts, decided not to reopen the proceedings under the erroneous impression that since the legal representatives of the deceased jagirdar were not brought on record within the period of limitation and " the declaratory decree about his virasat was passed several months after the Board issued the orders dismissing the case", it had no jurisdiction to reopen the matter which Was closed for reasons given by the Board earlier. With these remarks the Board once again transmitted the execution proceedings to the City Civil Court, Hyderabad.
(3.) This time, the City Civil Court dismissed the execution petition holding that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to execute the decree against the jagirdar in view of the provisions of section 25 of the Act, without transferring the proceedings to the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board. It is this decision of the trial Judge that is impugned before us.