ANAMIK PEDDA NARASANNA Vs. ANAMIK GUDA DAKANNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellants seek to file this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order of our learned brother, Anantanarayana Ayyar, J., refusing to grant an interim injunction restraining the respondent from obstructing the appellants from cultivating certain lands pending disposal of a second appeal preferred by the respondent against the decree of the District Judge, Mahboobnagar, confirming that of the District Munsif, dismissing the suit for recovery of possession of certain properties.

(2.) The office has raised an objection as to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the appellants could not take advantage of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The two grounds urged by the office are: (i) that the order in the present case cannot be described as a judgment within the terms of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and (ii) that as the order was made by the learned Judge in exercise of his second appellate jurisdiction the appeal without the leave of the learned Judge is incompetent.

(3.) It looks to us that both these objections are to be upheld. We find it difficult to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Vaidya, that the order in question answers the description of judgment within the wording of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and as laid down by the judgment of the Madras High Court in Tuljaram Row v. Algappa Chettiar, ILR 35 Mad 1 at p. 7 (FB). The test propounded by the Full Bench in that case was where the adjudication would put an end to the suit or proceeding so far as the Court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned, or, if its effect, if it ia not complied with, is put to an end to the suit or proceeding, then it is a judgment. In the course of judgment, this is what the learned Chief Justice observed :- "That test seems to me to be not what is the form of the adjudication but what is its effect in the suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever its form may be, and whatever may be the nature of the application on which it is made, is to pat an ead to the suit or proceeding so far as the Court before which the suit of proceeding is pending is concerned, or if its effect, if it is not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, I think the adjudication is a judgment within the meaning of the clause. An adjudication on an application which is nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit is not, in my opinion, a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent." The learned Chief Justice added :- "I think too, an order on an independent proceeding which is ancillary to the suit (not instituted as a step towards judgment, but with a view to rendering the judgment effective if obtained) e. g., an order on an application for an interim injunction or for the appointment of a receiver is a judgment within the meaning of the clause."