KATTA GOPAL RAO Vs. STATE OF A.P.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioners 1 and 2/A.1 and A.5 are accused of offences punishable under Sections 447, 427, 504 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short, the Act). It is alleged that the de facto complainant belongs to 'lambada' caste which is scheduled tribe and that on 10.12.2011 morning A.1 to A.6 and some others came to the disputed site in S.No.292 wherein basement for house was raised and they intended to dismantle the basement and that after coming to know about the same, the de facto complainant and her husband went to that site at 10:00 A.M. and that A.1 to A.6 abused both of them in filthy language and addressed her as 'lambadi bitch' and challenged her as to what they would do against them. Placing reliance on Asmathunnisa v State of A.P.1 of two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, it is contended by the petitioners' counsel that all the ingredients of Section 3(i)(x) of the Act are not found in F.I.R. and that therefore F.I.R. is liable to be quashed. Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v State of Maharashtra2 held that when caste of the accused is not mentioned in F.I.R. in order to constitute an offence under Section 3(i)(xi) of the Act, it is no ground for quashing F.I.R. After all, F.I.R. is not encyclopedia of the prosecution case and it is not 'be all and end all' of the prosecution version. (See also Subhash Kumar v State of Uttarakhan3, Surjit Singh Alias Gurmit Singh vs State of Punjab4, State of U.P. v Jashodha Nandan Gupta5, Gunnana Pentayya Alias Pentadu v State of Andhra Pradesh6, Alagarsamy v State7, Ranjit Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh8 and Jitender Kumar v State of Haryana9 of the Supreme Court). In that view of the matter, F.I.R. in this case relating to Section 3(i)(x) of the Act is not liable to be quashed for want of certain particulars in F.I.R. In any event, this F.I.R. is also for offences punishable under Sections 447, 427 and 504 IPC.

(2.) IT is contended by the petitioners' counsel that though the alleged offence was on 10.12.2011, F.I.R. was given by the de facto complainant on 31.12.2011 with inordinate delay. Delay in matters of this nature may not defeat the case itself. According to the de facto complainant, as noted in F.I.R., the matter was put up before the elders and since the accused did not turn up before the elders, she was giving the report on 31.12.2011. It is further contended by the petitioners' counsel that after service of injunction order on the de facto complainant by the Civil Court with regard to disputed property, this false F.I.R. was given as a counter-blast and with malafide intention. It can be also said that the de facto complainant became conscious of her rights under the Act, when the accused intended to assert his alleged rights through Civil Court. I find no reason to quash F.I.R. in this case.