(1.) The order dated 27-4-1993 of 1st respondent made in I.D.No. 149/87 is impugned in the present Writ Petition.
(2.) The case of the petitioner in brief is as follows: The petitioner was employed in 2nd respondent-Company and was initially taken into service on 22-3-1985 and though initially he was appointed as probationer it was extended twice and thereafter there had been no specific order extending the probation after 21-9-1985 and the petitioner continued to be employed upto 28-12-1995 when his services were terminated abruptly. Questioning the said termination order the petitioner moved the 1st respondent in I.D.No. 149/87 on a reference made by the Government of A.P. The 2nd respondent had taken a stand that the petitioner was an extended probationer even after 21-9-1985 and he was terminated on the ground that his work was unsatisfactory. The 1st respondent had negatived the relief to the petitioner and aggrieved by the same, the present Writ Petition is filed. The 2nd respondent-Company, in short hereinafter referred to as "Management" had taken a stand that the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches inasmuch as the award was challenged after a lapse of over three years. It is also stated that the impugned award was made on appreciation of evidence and this Court cannot reappreciate such evidence and what the Court has to examine is whether there was some evidence or no evidence at all for the conclusions reached by the quasi-judicial authorities and in the counter-affidavit itself the Management had narrated all the details and also several decisions relating to the principles for issuance of a writ of certiorari and also the rights of a probationer.
(3.) Sri Jagan Mohan, the learned Counsel representing the writ petitioner had submitted that there was no order passed by the Management either extending the period of probation after 21-9-1985 or otherwise and hence it should be taken that the petitioner continued in employment as a regular employee. The learned Counsel further contended that the petitioner was appointed on compassionate grounds in a permanent vacancy and therefore confirming his probation or temporary employment is only illusory. The learned Counsel further contended that even in the termination order, the Management had not shown that the petitioner was terminated in terms of the non-extension of probation, but had clearly stated it to be misconduct and hence unless a regular enquiry is conducted in accordance with law, the order of termination is not sustainable. The learned Counsel further had maintained that the 1st respondent had lost sight of this crucial and important aspect. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to Exs.W-1 to W-9 and also Ex.W-11 and also had taken me through the oral evidence available on record. The learned Counsel further had contended that the six months probation period specified by the Standing Orders had lapsed by expiry of six months and even in this view of the matter, the order of termination is bad. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the decisions of Apex Court in High Court of Madhya Pradesh v. S.N. Jhavar1 and D.P. Banerjee v, S.N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta2 and had contended that in view of the second category of cases specified by the Apex Court in the decision referred (1) supra, this Court may have to necessarily come to the conclusion that the order of termination is bad. The learned Counsel also had taken me through certain aspects of Ex.M-8 not containing the signature and also Exs.-M-5 and M-6, the Progress Reports and ultimately had submitted that even otherwise in the case of termination of services of a probationer, the substance of the order may have to be looked into whether the Management had thrown out the workman out of employment as a punitive measure though in fact the order as such may not specify the same and in the light of the facts and circumstances necessarily the Court may have to arrive at a conclusion that the termination is not a termination simpliciter for the unsatisfactory work of the probationer, but something more, keeping in view the alleged misconduct and hence the order of termination is only by way of punishment and not an order of termination simpliciter of a probationer for unsatisfactory work. The learned Counsel further contended that this dispute was made on reference and hence the provisions of Section 2-A 6f the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 may not be much relevant. The learned Counsel also had placed reliance on Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited v. Brojo Nath3 and had also drawn my attention to the preamble of the Industrial Employment (Standing) Orders Act, 1946 and also the scope and ambit of the said Act. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the claim statement and the stand taken by the petitioner that the termination is contrary to the Standing Orders. It was further contended that inasmuch as a stigma is attached, the termination order is not a termination simpliciter and it is the substance of the order which may have to be looked into and if all the facts and circumstances are taken into consideration it is clear that the power had not been exercised bona fide, but because of certain political reasons also, and while concluding the submissions the learned Counsel also had stated that here is an order of termination which will definitely shock the conscience of the Court and hence the impugned award cannot be sustained.