TODDAY TAPPERS CO Vs. GOVERNMENT OF A.P.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned single Judge dated 24-7-1998 made in Writ Petition No. 13397 of 1998 insofar as the declaration of the learned single Judge that the increase of 30% of the rentals in respect of the appellant Societies for the excise years 1997-98, over and above the rentals of the year 1996-97 is valid is concerned.

(2.) Before the learned single Judge who heard not only the above writ petition but also similar other writ petitions, it was contended on behalf of the toddy tappers cooperative societies that the impugned increase is totally arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India and in support of that plea, they have pressed into service the ratio of the judgment of this Court in Guntakal Toddy Tappers Co-op. Society Vs. Government of A.P. and Others, 1984 (1) APLJ 50 .

(3.) The learned Judge on consideration of the ratio of the above judgment rightly held that me said ratio is not applicable to the cases on hand. In Guntakal Toddy Tappers Co-op. Society's case (supra), as pointed out by the learned single Judge, the State Government had undertaken that it would not increase the licences fees during the five year period of licence. That is not the situation obtaining in the present case. On the other hand, the State in the present case had reserved the right to alter the terms and conditions of the licence and by virtue of that power, it has enhanced the licence fee. Nothing is placed before the Court to satisfy itself that the impugned increase would offend any of the postulates of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India, such as non-arbitrariness, reasonableness, fairness in action etc. Be that as it may, it is trite that the co-operative societies would pass on the additional burden always to the consumer of the liquor. Looking from that angle also, it cannot be said that the societies are subjected to any prejudice. The learned Counsel who argued for the appellant was not in a position to make out any substantive ground warranting our interference with the discretionary order made by the learned single Judge.