GAMPA SRINIVASA RAMESH KUMAR Vs. PUNAGANI VENKATARAMAIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision arises out of the order dated 13-8-1998 in E.A.No. 153 of 1996 in E.P.No. 46 of 1991 in O.S.No. 23 of 1991 on the file of the Court of the Junior Civil Judge, Nandalur.

(2.) 1st respondent obtained a money decree against the 2nd respondent and brought the half share of the 2nd respondent in the properties specified in the schedule appended to E.P.No. 46 of 1991 to sale. In the sale that was held on 28-4-1993, 3rd respondent figured as the highest bidder and so the sale was knocked down in his favour. 2nd respondent filed E.A.No. 110 of 1993 under Order XXI Rule 90 C.P.C. to set aside the said .sale, which was dismissed on 27-12-1994 for default. I.A.No. 5 of 1995 filed for restoration of the said E.A.No. 110 of 1993 was also dismissed on 7-2-1995 and the sale was confirmed in favour of the 3rd respondent on 7-2-1995. In the meanwhile 2nd respondent preferred C.M.A.No. 4 of 1995 and obtained stay of all further proceedings in E.P.No. 46 of 1991, by the order dated 3-3-1995 in LA. No.44 of 1995. The said CM.A. was dismissed on 6-11-1995 after contest. Thereafter Sale Certificate in favour of 3rd respondent was issued on 2-3-1996. Subsequently, 3rd respondent filed E.A. No.153 of 1996 seeking delivery of possession of the property purchased by him, on 12-9-1996. Revision petitioner, who is the son of the 2nd respondent-Judgment Debtor, filed E.A.No. 153 of 1996 under Order XXI Rule 99 read with Section 151 C.P.C. for dismissing the said E.A., inter alia, on the ground of limitation and on the ground that the undivided share in the property cannot be delivered possession to the auction purchaser. The said petition was dismissed by the order under revision. Hence this revision.

(3.) The only contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this revision is that since the sale was confirmed on 7-2-1995, E.A.No. 153 of 1996 filed on 12-9-1996 by the 3rd respondent seeking delivery of possession of the property purchased by him in Court auction is hopelessly barred by time in view of the Article 134 of the Limitation Act. It is his contention that the Court below was in error in observing that the limitation starts from the date of issuance of sale certificate but not from the date of confirmation of the sale. The contention of the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent is that since all further proceedings in the E.P. were stayed by virtue of the order dated 3-3-1995 in I.A.No.44 of 1995 in C.M.A.No. 4 of 1995 filed by the 2nd respondent, questioning the order when the said stay was vacated only on 6-11-1995, period covered by the stay order has to be excluded from computing the period of limitation as per Section 15 of the Limitation Act, and if that period is excluded, the petition E.A.No. 153 of 1996 is well within time so the order under revision is unassailable.