SHAFIQ AHMED Vs. P D SUGUNA AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner seeks enlargement of the time fixed by this Court, inter alia, in the conditional passed in C.R.P. No. 5502 of 2001 directing the revision petitioner to pay an amount of Rs. 500/- each, to the defendants 1, 2 and 4 on or before 24-06-2002. In the event of any default of the same, it was further directed that the revision petition should stand automatically dismissed. The time fixed for compliance is obviously 15 days i.e., from 10-06-2002 to 24-06-2002. As aforesaid, the petitioner is now seeking to enlarge that time on the premise that he could not comply with the conditional order inasmuch as he could not receive the certified copy of the order within the time. There has been no gain saying that the petitioner received the certified copy of the order, dated 10-06-2002 passed by this Court in C.R.P. No. 5502 of 2001. Obviously the petitioner could not have complied with the condition by depositing the amount. It is therefore fairly clear that the non-compliance of the conditional order passed by this Court is on account of the reasons beyond control of the revision petitioner.

(2.) The application filed seeking enlargement of time is now sought to be resisted on the sole premise that such an enlargement is not permissible in view of the amended provisions under Section 148 of the Amending Act, 1999. Section 148 of C.P.C. reads as follows:

(3.) It is the contention of the learned counsel Sri Rajamalla Reddy that the present application cannot be considered since 30 days period has been elapsed even far prior to the filing of the present application seeking enlargement of time. A perusal of Section 148 C.P.C. herein above excerpted clearly makes it obvious that the Court has got discretion to enlarge the time even though the application filed in regard thereto after the expiry of the period fixed by the Court earlier. In the first instance, therefore, what is clear is that an application, seeking enlargement of time can be maintained even after the expiry of the period fixed by the Court. Nextly the Court is given discretion to enlarge the time. Under the amended provisions that discretion has now been curtailed by limiting the period to be enlarged time to time to 30 days. So the Court is given discretion to enlarge the time only upto 30 days. This enlargement may be from time to time in brief spells. For instance one week or 10 days, but the total period shall be limited to 30 days. That does not mean that the application, seeking enlargement should be filed within that period of 30 days as fixed by the statute. From a perusal of Section 148 C.P.C. I see no dichotomy, inter alia, in the Section. It clearly shows that enlargement of the period can be granted by the discretion of the Court even if the application in regard thereto is filed beyond the period fixed earlier by the Court. If such an application is filed .beyond the period fixed by the Court, which is even beyond the period of 30 days, on the premise that the discretion is curtailed by limiting the total period to be enlarged at 30 days by the statute, the other discretion given to the Court to entertain the application filed even after the expiry of the period fixed by it earlier cannot be said to have been taken away. Even in the wake of any such divergence, inter alia, in the Section, an attempt shall be made to read the Section with a holistic vision by making an endeavour to reconcile both the provisions so as to subserve the interest of justice. When once the application, seeking enlargement of time can be maintained even after the expiry of the period fixed by the Court earlier, that time cannot be limited to 30 days which is to be limited in my considered view to be granted by the Court time to time in the application filed seeking enlargement. Therefore, the amended provisions by curtailing the discretion of the Court by limiting the period of enlargement to 30 days would come into operation when once the application is filed seeking enlargement.