GHANI M A Vs. P RAMI REDDY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Respondent, who is the landlord of the plaint schedule property, filed O.S.No. 3853 of 1987 on the file of the Court of V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, seeking eviction of the appellant from the plaint schedule property after giving notice to quit under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. Appellant filed a written statement, inter alia, contendiang that the notice to quit is not valid. The trial Court, accepting the contention of the appellant that there is no proper notice to quit, dismissed the suit. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent preferred A.S.No. 147 of 1989. The learned I Additional Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases - cum- Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, who heard the appeal had by the judgment under appeal, allowed the same and directed eviction of the appellant from the plaint schedule property. Hence this second appeal by the defendant in the suit.

(2.) The only point for consideration in this appeal is whether there is valid service of the notice to quit on the appellant?

(3.) The main contention of Sri V. Srinivas, learned counsel for the appellant, is that since notice to quit sent by the respondent to the appellant by registered post, admittedly, was not served on the appellant, the mere fact that the postman made an endorsement on the registered notice that the appellant is continuously absent from 24-3-1987 to 31-3-1987 is not and cannot be said to be a valid service of notice on the appellant. It is his contention that as per Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act notice to quit can be served on the tenant by different modes and so respondent could have, as per the said section, served the notice on any of the members of the family or the servants of the appellant, if he [appellant] was not available and since the respondent did not even contend that he tendered or tried to tender the notice to quit on any of the members of the family of the appellant or his servants, the alleged affixture of notice to quit to the door of the house of the appellant is not and cannot be a valid notice to quit under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. It is his contention that mere production of photograph showing affixture of notice to a door cannot be treated as an affixture of the notice to the door of the demised premises, where the appellant is living. It is his contention that the decisions relied on by the first appellate court have no appliction to the facts of this case, and so the reversing judgment of the first appellate Court is liable to be set aside.