PUNUKOLLU RAMACHANDRA RAO Vs. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The writ petitioners are the appellants. They filed the writ petition assailing the validity of the final notice issued by Gudivada Municipality, Gudivada dated 4-1-1997 informing the petitioners that their request to renew the lease on enhanced rent at 18% only has been rejected and calling upon the petitioners to send their consent letters for enhanced rent at the rate of 331/3 % on the existing rent. The rejection of the request of the petitioners was assailed mainly on the ground of discrimination. The plea of discrimination is founded on the fact that on a previous occasion, the Special Officer of the Municipality had renewed the lease in respect of shop No. 1 at the enhanced rent at 15% and, therefore, the petitioners should have been granted renewal of lease at the same rate. This contention of the petitioners was not found favour with the learned Single Judge, The learned Single Judge held

(2.) The view taken by the learned Single Judge has the support of the ratio of the pronouncements of the Apex Court in Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit Singh Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority v, Daulatmal Jain, and State of Haryana v. Ramkumar Mann. The very grounds, which were urged before the learned Single Judge were reiterated before us also.

(3.) The power granted to the Municipality under Rule 12 of Regulation of Receipts and Expenditure Rules, 1968 (for short, the Rules), to renew the lease should be brought to bear on facts and circumstances of each case, and the exercise of that power cannot be standardized. If it is standardized, then, it will lose the essence of discretion and it will become a mandatory rule. Looking from that angle, simply because the Special Officer, in a given case, had exercised the discretionary power under Rule 12 of the Rules, and in his wisdom and discretion and having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case thought it fit to renew the lease in respect of shop No. 1 at the enhanced rent of 15%, the petitioners cannot claim, as a mater of right or course, that the leases granted to them should also be renewed at the same rate. Further, we do not find any factor or circumstances, which could vitiate the demand made by the Municipality in the impugned notice. No substantive ground is made out by the petitioners to interfere with the impugned order of the learned Single Judge.