UNION OF INDIA Vs. T MADHUSUDANA SWAMI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The only question that arises for consideration is:

(2.) Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 empowers the court to admit any appeal or application, other than those provided by Order XXI of Civil Procedure Code even after the expiry of the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescrib- ed period. Section 29 (2) says that where any special or local law pres- cribes any period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Act, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such per. iod was prescribed by the Schedule to the Act and that the provisions of sections 4 to 24 sha'l apply in that behalf in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

(3.) The applicability of section 5 by virtue of section 29 (2) to tribunals which are not civil courts was considered by a Division Bench of this Court (to which I was a party) in K Venkaiah and others vs- K Venkateswara Rao and another (1) A I R 1978Andhra Pradesh 166- There too the authorities under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1950 were clothed with the powers of the civil court In the matter of enquiry. Yet the Division Bench held that the tribunal not being a civil court, the Limitation Act does not apply- Under the RAILWAYS ACT, 1989 too, there is little doubt that the Claims Commis. sionet is not a civil Court though he is clothed with certain powers of the Civil Court mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover sub section (2) of section 82.C not only provides the period within which an application for compensation should be filed but it also pro- vides for condoning the delay on sufficient cause being shown. The sub-section, however, places a ceiling upon the period which could be condoned, which means that in no case, shall any application be enter- tained after the expiry of one year of the occurrence. In such a situation the .application of section 5, which does not recognise any such ceiling, may mean a further extension of time, even beyond the period of one year prescribed by sub-section (2). In other words, section 5 of the Limitation Act is inconsistent with section 82-C (2) of the RAILWAYS ACT, 1989 In any event, as mentioned earlier the Claims Commissioner, not being a Civil Court, the Limitation Act has no application to it.