A GYANESHWAR RAO Vs. MAHMOOD SHAREEF

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision is filed against an order allowing I. A. No. 400 of 1980 filed by the 1st respondent herein against the 2nd respondent herein and her children for specific performance of an agreement of sale.

(2.) The relevant facts, in brief, are: The petitioner herein filed O. S. No. 3365 of 1979 against the 2nd respondent and her children for specific performance of an agreement of sale in respect of land comprised in S. Nos. 1 and 124 situated at Mir Sagar, Hyderabad District and for execution of a registered sale deed in pursuance thereof. The defendant, Ameer Bi, took a plea in the written statement that the pattedar of the suit land is Mahamood Sharif (1st respondent herein). But the plaintiff did not choose to make him a party to the suit. Prior to the filing of the suit, succession proceedings were initiated and they ended in favour of Mahmood Sharif (1st respondent herein) and against the defendant (Ameer Bi) on the death of the late Maqdoom Sharif, the father of the 1st respondent herein. On the basis of the alleged agreement of sale proceedings were sought to be initiated before the revenue authorities for the rectification of the entries in the revenue records under section 58 of the Land Revenue Act in respect of the aforesaid two S. Nos. wherein the plaintiff sought his name to be included by deleting the name of Mahmood Sharif and Ameer Bi. respondents 1 and 2 herein. But the application was dismissed directing the claimant for a recourse to civil court. The proceedings under Ex. B-2 disclose that the collectorate issued a memo to Ameer Bi saying that it had no jurisdiction to inquire into the succession certificate already sanctioned in favour of Mohmood Sharif. The appeal against that order to the Joint Collector was dismissed. Mahmood Sharif, as Pattedar, filed also a declaration before the Land Ceiling Authority and the necessary orders also were passed in the said declaration computing the said S. Nos. in his extent. In the suit, later, the said Ameer Bi, along with her children, tried to enter into a compromise with the plaintiff. At that stage, the 1st respondent, as a proposed third-party, filed I. A. No. 400 of 1980 under O. 1, R. 10. Civil P. C. To implead him in the suit as a necessary and proper party, which was contested by the plaintiff, petitioner herein. But the trial court allowed the petition on the ground that the proposed third party has got right, interest and title over the suit property and, therefore, certainly he is a necessary and proper party though the suit is filed for specific performance of an agreement of sale seeking relief only against the 2nd respondent, viz. Ameer Bi. The Lower court further found that having regard to the various circumstances as disclosed in the voluminous documents filed on behalf of the proposed third-party, it is necessary to adjudicate the rights in this suit itself and if it is not done so, it would give rise to multiplicity of proceedings, which must be avoided. Hence this revision.

(3.) The Contention in the main of Sri Chennakesava Rao, learned Council for the petitioner, is that in a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale , any person claiming the or share adverse to the vendor cannot be impleaded, because firstly, it will change the nature of the suit and secondly, it will introduce new questions which are not involved in the suit.