(1.) These four writ petitions, which involve a common question of law, can be dealt with and disposed of together. In all these four writ petitions, notifications issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act are being challenged, inter alia, on the ground that the Land Acquisition Officer has taken an inordinately and unreasonably long time for passing the award; or that no award has been passed in spite of lapse of such a long time, as the case may be.
(2.) So far as W. P. No. 3907/1980 is concerned, the notification under Section 4 (1) was issued on 29-7-1971. Enquiry under Section 5-A was held, and the declaration under Section 6 was made on 7-12-1972. Then, after a delay of about three years, notices under Section 9 (3) and Section 10 were issued on 18-11-1975. The award was, however, passed only on 29-4-1980. Meanwhile, this writ petition was filed on 28-4-1980, and admitted on 29-4-1980. So far as W. P. No. 2715/79 is concerned, the notification under Section 4 (1) is dated 29-8-1968, and the declaration under Section 6 is dated 18-1-1970. Notices under Section s 9 (3) and 10 were issued even in Feb., 1970 itself, but the award came to be passed only on 31-3-1979. Meanwhile, the writ petition was filed on 27-3-1979, and admitted on 29-3-1979. W. P. Nos. 5563 and 5564 of 1979 challenge the same notification, though by different parties, interested in different properties. The notification concerned in these two writ petitions is dated 2-8-1973. (Earlier a notification under Section 4 (1) was issued on 30-1-1969, but inasmuch as the declaration under Section 6 was made beyond three years, it lapsed and, accordingly, a fresh notification was issued on 2-8-1973). This notification invoked the power under Section 17 (4) of the Act and dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5-A. Thereafter, the declaration under Section 6 was made on 11-7-1974. No award was passed until the filing of the writ petitions. On 7-9-1979 this Court granted stay of all further proceedings, with the result that no award could be passed thereafter.
(3.) The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that, keeping the acquisition proceedings pending for such a long time, without passing the award and without paying the compensation to the owners, is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power. It is argued that, according to law, the price payable is the market rate prevailing on the date of the notification under Section 4 (1). In that view of the matter, the acquisition proceedings must be concluded by the Land Acquisition Officer as early as possible, and without any avoidable delay. The delay of about 8 to 10 years --it is argued -- is unreasonable and oppressive, since by doing so, the owners are deprived of the fair equivalent. Over the last 8 to 10 years the prices have increased several-folds, and paying today the compensation at the rate prevailing about 8 to 10 years earlier is an abuse of power, and the provisions of the Act.