G HANUMANTHA RAO Vs. L V SUBBAIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE respondent presented a plaint in the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Dhone, arraying the petitioner herein as sole defendant, claiming the relief of recovery of money, on the basis of a promissory note, 19.03.2001. THE plaint was returned on 23.03.2004, on the ground that adequate Court fee was not paid; fixing seven days time for compliance with the objection. However, the respondent represented the plaint only about 41/2 years thereafter. He filed I.A.No.743 of 2008 under Section 151 C.P.C., with a prayer to condone the delay. THE trial Court ordered notice to the petitioner. He filed a counter opposing the application. It was stated that the issue pertaining to the promissory note, was resolved between the parties and that the suit was filed with a malicious intention. He further pleaded that the delay is enormous and it cannot be condoned at all. THE trial Court allowed the I.A., through order dated 01.05.2010. THE petitioner challenges the same.

(2.) SRI C.Prakash Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the trial Court recorded a clear finding to the effect that the reasons pleaded by the respondent for condonation of such enormous delay, are unbelievable and still the I.A., was allowed. He contends that though the Court would adopt a liberal approach in condonation of delay in representation of proceedings, it cannot be to the extent of defeating the very concept of limitation.

(3.) IN the last paragraph of the order, the trial Court summed up its conclusions. Though the sentences are not properly worded, the gist of discussion is that the plea of the respondent that he lost the communication with his counsel is unbelievable and that once he has entrusted the matter to his counsel, he was under obligation to be in touch with him from time to time, at least once in six months or one year and it is highly improbable that the respondent did not have communication with his counsel for a period of 1687 days. Having said this, learned Judge condoned the delay on the only ground that the deficit Court fee has been paid and he felt it appropriate to adjudicate the matter on merits.