LAWS(APH)-2001-9-63

ENDERI LAKSHMIRAM Vs. SHAKI IBRAHIM

Decided On September 21, 2001
ENDERI LAKSHMIRAM Appellant
V/S
SHAKI IBRAHIM Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision petition is filed by the 1st Respondent in the E.A.No. 184 of 1994 in E.P.No.52 of 1994 against the Decree Holder in R.C.No. 47 of 1992, in whose favour an order of eviction of the 2nd Respondent was filed.

(2.) Yhe petitioner herein filed R.C.No. 47 of 1992 for eviction of the 2nd Respondent herein, who was the tenant from the Petitioner. Pending the proceedings, the Petitioner filed an application under Sec. 11 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for a direction to the Respondent therein to deposit the arrears of rent and failing which all further proceedings should be stopped and the Respondent must be directed to put the premises in possession of the Petitioner. Though the Respondents therein contested that the Petitioner is not entitled for any relief, the Rent Controller passed an order, having given a finding that there is no dispute that there was a tenancy between the petitioner and the Respondent, directing the Respondent therein to deposit the arrears of rents within a period of 15 days and failing which all further proceedings being stopped and the Respondent was further directed to put the Petitioner into possession of the suit premises. As the Respondent therein failed to comply the said order passed in I.A.No.100 of 1994 under Sec. 11, consequently the main RCC as closed in terms of the said order. Thereafter the present Petitioner, who was also the Petitioner in R.C.No. 47 of 1992 filed E.P.No. 52 of 1994 seeking execution of the order passed under Sec.ll (4) as well as the orders passed in the final R.C.C. When the said E.P., was pending, the 1st Respondent herein filed E.A.No. 184 of 1994 in E.P. 52 of 1994, claiming that he is a third party to the proceedings and the warrant issued in respect of the suit schedule premises, bearing Door No. 12/23, should not be executed against him as he was a lessee on a monthly rent of Rs.650/- from Sri S.R.Y. Ankineedu Prasad and Sri S.R.Y. Padmanabha Prasad, who are the owners of the premises. According to the Respondent, he came to know of the order of eviction, which was obtained by the petitioner against the 2nd Respondent only when the Court Amin came to the schedule premises on 10-11-1994 for execution. As the 1st Respondent is the tenant from the original owners, the said eviction order obtained by the Petitioner against the 2nd Respondent cannot be enforced against the 1st Respondent. Accordingly, he sought for recall of the warrant issued to the Amin. This was contested by the present Petitioner stating about the proceedings taken up by him against the 2nd Respondent. According to the Petitioner, the premises was leased out to him by Sri Ankineedu Prasad and Sri Padmanabha Prasad, who are the original owners of the premises. The Petitioner herein in turn leased out the same to the 2nd Respondent. As the 2nd Respondent had committed default in payment of rent, he was constrained to file eviction proceedings by filing R.C.C.No.47 of 1992 against the 2nd Respondent. While the said proceedings were pending, he also filed I.A.No. 100 of 1994 seeking a direction under Sec. 11 of the Act to the Respondent to deposit the arrears of rent and also for a consequential order of stopping all further. Proceedings as well as to put the petitioner into possession by the Respondent/tenant. The Rent Controller passed orders on 22-7-1994, directing the tenant to pay the arrears of rent within a period of 15 days; failing which the Respondent/tenant was directed to put the into possession of the premises. As the Respondent/tenant has not complied with the said order; final orders were passed in the R.C. on 16-8-1994 in terms of the order passed in I.A.No. 100 of 1994 closing the R.C.C. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed the E.P., for execution of the order passed under Sec. 11 (4), which was made the final order while closing the R.C.C. The Rent Controller, on the above contentions, framed the issue to the effect 'Whether the Petitioner in E.A. is entitled for the relief as claimed?' The Rent Controller after considering the rival contentions and also the material on record, felt that the order passed under Sec. 11 (4) is not an executable order and the Rent Controller has no power to order eviction under Sec.ll(4). According to the Rent Controller, if the tenant fails to comply the orders, the claims have to be carried out in the main R.C.C. As no such order of eviction was passed under Sec.10 of the Act, the petitioner in the R.C.C. is not entitled to execute the order under Sec.11(4). According to him, the order passed in I.A.No. 100 of 1994 has no legal sanctity. Further, according to the 2nd Respondent/Judgment-Debtor, under Ex.B-4 Memo, he has delivered possession of the property to the original landlords, who in turn inducted the petitioner in E.A. as their tenant. Therefore, the petitioner in R.C.C. is not entitled to dispossess the Petitioner in E.A. under the guise of executing the order that was obtained against the Respondent in the R.C.C.No. 47 of 1992. According to the Rent Controller a fresh tenancy was created between the petitioner in E.A. and the original landlord and consequently the tenancy rights of the 1st Respondent in the E.A., are extinguished. Therefore, the learned Rent Controller allowed the application filed by the 1st Respondent herein under Rule 23(7) of the Rent Control Rules. Aggrieved by the said proceedings, the Petitioner in whose favour the eviction order was passed has come up in the present revision.

(3.) The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the Rent Controller was in error in holding that the order passed under Sec.ll(4) is not executable. It is also contended that the orders passed under Sec. 11(4) are independent and are executable as the tenant had committed default in compliance of the order passed under Sec.11(4). According to the learned Counsel, if the contention of the 1st Respondent is accepted that the order passed under Sec.11(4) is not executable, the very purpose of passing such an order would frustrate and the provisions of Sec.11(4) would become nugatory. The learned Counsel relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of T. Venkatesam v. A Krishnaiah where this Court held that the Rent Controller, who passed an order under Sec. 11(4) has got implied power under Sec.11 to order execution of the same. The learned Counsel also contended that the Rent Controller had erred in holding that the Rent Controller has no power to order eviction under Sec. 11 (4) and even if it is so issed, it is beyond the powers of Sec.ll. The said observations of the Rent Controller are clearly erroneous in the light of the above-referred decision. The learned Counsel also contended that when the Petitioner filed an application under Sec.11 the 2nd Respondent herein contested that said application alleging that he was a tenant to the original owners and there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the present petitioner and the 2nd Respondent. But the said contention was negatived by the Rent Controller while passing orders under Sec.11 (4) and consequently directed the 2nd Respondent to deposit the arrears of rent within 15 days; failing which the 2nd Respondent was directed to put the petitioner in possession. The 2nd Respondent in spite of complying the said order, in collusion with the original owners from whom the Petitioner had taken the premises on lease and with whose permission the building was sub-leased to the 2nd Respondent and created a surrender by the 2nd Respondent to the original owners and set up a fresh lease in favour of the 1st Respondent herein. It is contended that when an order of eviction was passed by the Rent Controller against the 2nd Respondent, the 2nd Respondent is not free to surrender the said premises to anybody else, except to the petitioner, who was the decreeholder. The 2nd Respondent had surrendered the same to some third parties who are also bound by the said order of eviction passed against the 2nd Respondent, as their possession is only through the 2nd Respondent. Therefore, it is contended that even if there was a lease from the original owners, the said lease is not at all valid, as the original owners have not obtained their possession legally and the possession if it is obtained, it is only collusive through the 2nd Respondent and hence the eviction order passed against the 2nd Respondent is equally binding on the original owners as well as the subsequent tenant from them. Therefore, it is contended that the present application filed by the 1st Respondent under Rule 23(7)of the Rent Control Rules is not maintainable and the petition is liable to be dismissed. The learned Counsel also contended that it is not in dispute that the petitioner is admittedly a tenant from the original owners, whose tenancy is not disputed. In fact, when R.CNo.47 of 1992 was pending, the original owners filed I.A.No.379of 1994 to get themselves impleaded alleging that the petitioner had changed their title, but the trial Court dismissed the said application having found that the original owners are not necessary parties in the said R.C.C., which was filed by the petitioner as landlord of the 2nd Respondent/subtenant. In the light of the above, it is also contended that the original owners are well aware of the pendency of the eviction proceedings against the 2nd Respondent. Therefore, the 2nd Respondent is not free to surrender the premises to the original owners and the original owners also not entitled to take possession from the 2nd Respondent against whom the eviction order was passed ordering delivery of possession to the petitioner herein. Therefore, it is contended that the impugned order is liable to be set aside. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the following decisions: Changanlal v. Narsingh Pershad, Koneru Aruna Kumari v. Shaik Ali and S. Venkata Reddy v. M/s. New Tirnmala Emporium.