A P TRANSCO Vs. P VIJAYA KUMAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Interpretation of Regulation 57 (6) of the A.P. State Electricity Board Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations is in question in this appeal filed by the appellants herein questioning the judgment dated 29-8-2000 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 11616 of 1999. The respondent herein filed the said writ petition for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus directing the appellants- respondents therein to treat the period during which he was placed under suspension from 16-12-1992 to 1-3-1999 as on leave and for further direction to treat the said period as on duty and pay his full salary for the same. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. A Criminal case was initiated against the respondent for alleged commission of an offence under Sections 148, 307 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act. The said criminal proceeding - numbered as Sessions Case 211 of 1998 - was tried by the Assistant Sessions Judge. He having not been found guilty was acquitted by a judgment dated 8-2-1999. He was placed under suspension on 16-12-1992. Upon acquittal a representation was made by the respondent whereupon he was reinstated. The said period of suspension was directed to be regularised in terms of Memo dated 14-5-1990. The learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition filed by the respondent herein inter alia on the ground that in a case of same nature where a criminal case had ended in acquittal the period of suspension was treated to be a period as on duty.

(2.) Sri S. Ravindranath, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has raised a short question in support of the appeal that as an order of suspension was passed under Regulation 11 of the Regulations, the impugned judgment must be held to be contrary to or inconsistent with Regulation 57(6) thereof. The said Regulation 57(6) reads thus:

(3.) The constitutionality of the said Regulation is not in question. A bare perusal of the aforementioned Regulation clearly shows that in terms thereof in the event of acquittal of an employee in a criminal case, upon being permitted to rejoin duty he will not be entitled to anything more than what he has received if he had been granted the leave admissible to him during the period of his absence from duty since his detention and the amount of subsistence grant already drawn by him be adjusted against his pay and allowances. In view of the aforementioned Regulation which lays down a condition of service as to how the said period of suspension be treated, the learned Single Judge went wrong in passing the impugned order.