TANGADU SOMESWARA RAO Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners herein are the accused Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 in C.C. No. 126 of 1998 on the file of the Judicial Ist Class Magistrate, Palasa. The prosecution was lanuched against the accused on the complaint filed under S. 29(i)(a) r/w S. 3-K(i)(viii) of the Insecticides Act, 1968, and Rule 19 of the Insecticides Rules, 1971. The complainant was examined as P.W. 1 on 27-11-1998 and the charges were framed on 4-2-1999 and thereafter the case was posted for trial from time to time. At that stage, the revision-petitioners herein, who are accused Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5, filed an application in Crl. M.P. No. 1275 of 2001 to stop all further proceedings in the above C.C., and acquit them on the ground that the prosecution did not produce any witness so far and the case is pending trial for more than two years and, therefore, they are entitled for the benefit of "common cause" cases reported in (1) AIR 1996 SC 1619 and (2) AIR 1997 SC 1539. The learned Magistrate dismissed the said application and questioning the same this revision is filed.

(2.) The only question that arises for consideration in this case is whether non-completion of the trial within two years is attributable to the prosecution or to the petitioners. Though on certain dates, the complainant was absent, insofar as the dates on which the complainant was present, some of the accused were not present and they have filed an application to condone their absence and it is not the case of the petitioners-accused that they were ready to cross-examine P.W. 1 and P.W. 1 was not ready for cross-examination and the delay is attributable only to the P.W. 1, complainant, but not to the petitioners. The learned Magistrate held that the accused-petitioners themselves have failed to cross-examine P.W. 1 and, therefore, they cannot take advantage of their own wrong and seek to discharge them from the criminal proceedings. The learned Magistrate rightly held that the accused-petitioners are not entitled for the benefit of the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court as the delay, in not completing the trial within two years, is attributable to the petitioners alone.

(3.) Learned counsel appearing for the accused-petitioners submits that the crucial date of commencing the trial is the date on which the petitioners received the summons on 8-10-1998 and, therefore, if that is taken, the petitioners are entitled for the benefit of the judgments of the Apex Court.