THUMMALA APPALARAJU Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) 1. The sole point that arises in this revision is whether the lease entered into under Exhibits A-11 and A-9 on 6th July, 1972 and 10th July, 1972 respectively, by which the preexisting lease said to have been brought into vogue in the year 1969 and continued by these two contracts of lease to be in subsistence for a period of 99 years to be reckoned from the date of viz., 1969, are hit by section 7 (2) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act (hereinafter called 'the Act).

(2.) Relevant facts in brief are Two different leases were entered into for the extents of Ac. 3.72 cents and Ac. 3.33 cents in favour of two lessees in the year 1969. While the said leases were said to be in existence, on 6th July, 1972, under Exhibit A-11 and likewise under Exhibit A-9 on 10th July, 1972 two agreements were entered into and from the recitals it transpires that the leases will be for a period of 99 years to be reckoned from the year 1969. The Tribunals below on the provisions enacted in section 7 (2) of the Act held that these being fresh leases exceeding six years, are null and void and therefore, will have to be reckoned and computed in the holding of the declarant-petitioner. Hence this revision.

(3.) The learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri M. Jagannadha Rao contends that it is true that by virtue of Exhibits A-9 and A-11, the lease was continued for a duration of 99 years and though admittedly these agreements were brought into vogue on 6th July, 1972 and 10th July, 1972, surely such leases are hit by the provisions enacted in section 7 (2) of the Act. But even assuming that these agreements are rendered null and void and thereby become non est as it were, still it is open to the petitioner to fall back upon the previous statutory tenancy and if that is so, surely the tenant is entitled to continue to be in possession and therefore, the land will have to be excluded from the holding of the petitioner-defendant. Reliance was placed on three decisions of the Supreme Court. In Anand Nivas (P) Ltd. v. S. Anandji, it is held by the majority judgment: "A person remaining in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly, though in law not accurately, called a statutory tenant. Such a person is not a tenant at all he has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increase, if any, and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal. The next case relied on is Murlidhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh wherein it is held: "That an agreement in the lease deed, providing that the parties will never claim the benefit of the Act and that the provisions of the Act will not be applicable to the lease deed, is illegal in view of section 23 of the Contract Act and it will not preclude the tenant from contending that the suit for eviction filed without the permission of the District Magistrate was not maintainable. The tenant could not have waived the benefit of section 3. In Siraj-Ul-Haq v. S. C. Board of Waqf, the Supreme Court while dealing with the aspect of interpretation of statutes has held : "It is well settled that in construing the provisions of a statute Courts should be slow to adopt a construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective and attempt must always be made so as to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the Statute. In such a case, it is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the provision and to make the whole of it effective and operative.