M BALAGANGADHARA SASTRY Vs. STATE OF A P

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This application by a Government servant, under Art. 226 of the Constitution is to quash the proceedings of the Tribunal for Disciplinary proceedings, Hyderabad directing joint enquiry into the charges of misconduct levelled against him and another. The material facts leading to this writ petition may briefly be stated Charges have been framed against the petitioner by the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings Hyderabad in T. E. C. No. 3/ 68 pending before it for misconduct for violating the departmental rules when he was working as Executive Engineer, Zilla Parishad, Guntur. The third respondent herein, who was working as an Asst. Engineer, Zilla Parishad, Guntur at that time, is also charged in T. E. C. No. 4/68 before the same tribunal (or misconduct, and Sri C.P. Brahman, who was working as the Divisional Accountant in the office of the Executive Engineer, Zilla Parishad, Guntur was also proceeded against by the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings for charges of misconduct and the enquiry relating to him is already over. But the enquiries relating to the petitioner and the 3rd res. pondent are pending before the Tribunal. Charges Nos. 4, 5 and 6 in T. E. C. No. 3/68 appear to correspond to charge Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in T. E. C. No 4/68, although the other charges in both the cases are different. The application of the Director of Prosecutions praying for recording common evidence in both the proceedings was opposed by the charged officers. The Tribunal, overruling the objections of the charged officers, allowed the application and directed joint trial. Aggrieved by that order, the petitioner has approached this court and filed this Writ Petition. Sri Venkata Subba Rao, for the petitioner contends that the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings has no jurisdiction to club two or more cases and try the two charged officers jointly and that the joint trial would prejudice the interests of his client and the other accused officer and hence, the impugned order is liable to be quashed. Sri Suryanarayana Murthy for the third respondent sails with the petitioner. The claim of the petitioner is opposed by the Government Pleader contending inter-alia that the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings is empowered to pass the impugned order that no prejudice would be caused to the accused officers by joint trial and that the joint trial is valid, proper and justified in the circumstances of the case and hence, there is no merit in this writ petition. The questions that arise for decision are : 1. Whether the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings has jurisdiction to club two or more cases and try the charged officers jointly ?

(2.) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances, the impugned order directing joint trial is liable to be quashed? For a proper appreciation of question No, 1, it is necessary to refer to the material provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Act (II of 1960} (hereinafter called the Act) and the Rules made thereunder. By Section 3 of the Act, the Government shall constitute a Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings with one or more members who are judicial officers having the status of a District Judge. Section 4 provides for reference to the Tribunal by the Government of cases where allegations of misconduct on the part of the Government servants are made, for inquiry and report. Section 5 empowers the Tribunal to summon and examine witnesses and to direct production of documents and to appoint an assessor. The Code of Civil Procedure was made applicable to the conduction of inquiries by the Tribunal only in so far as the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person, discovery and production of any document and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents, is concerned, Section 6 refers to the procedure to be adopted by the Tribunal where it consists of more than one member. The Chairman may direct the inquiry to be held by a single member or by all the members sitting together. Sec. 7 requires the Tribunal to report its findings to the Government after the completion of the inquiry and also recommend the penalties to be imposed on such Government servant if it finds him to be guilty of the charges levelled against him. The State Government under Section 8, have to consider the report of the Tribunal and pass such orders thereon as they tbink fit. Section 10 empowers the Government to make rules for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act. The rules, after notification in the Andbra Pradesh Gazettee, are subject to such modifications as the State Legislature may make in that regard. As the rules have statutory force, they are binding and enforceable. Rule 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1961 (hereinafter called the Rules) prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Disciplinary proceedings Tribunal in conducting the inquiries into cases referred to it under the Act. Under Rule 7 (1) (i), the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal as soon as the receipt of the records relating to allegations of misconduct against a Government servant, has to frame appropriate charges and communicate them to the delinquent officer with a list of witnesses to be examined in support of each of the charges and with particulars relating to the date and place of inquiry. Under rule 7 (1) (ii), the Tribunal is required to furnish copies of statements of witnesses recorded by the concerned department to the Government servant who is at liberty either to admit or deny the charge or charges. As per clause (iii) of sub-rule (1) to rule 7, the Government servent is entitled to file a written statement of his defence together with a list of witnesses whom he wishes to examine after completion of evidence adduced by the prosecution. Clause (iv) of sub-rule (1) to rule 7 which is material for our purpose reads thus

(3.) A combined reading of the provisions of sections 4, 5 and 6 and rule 7 manifests that there is no specific provision empowering the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal to have joint trial of two or more charged officers. It is also clear that the Civil Procedure Code, as referred to above is applicable only in respect of the summoning of witnesses, inspection of documents and other matters specified in section 5 of the Act. The tribunal for Disciplinary proceedings is not a court. It is only a special tribunal created under a statute for the purpose of conducting inquiries relating to charges of corruption and misconduct against Government servants on the reference made by the Government under Section 4 of the Act. Though a District Judge, a judicial Officer, is presiding over the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, he is only functioning as a persona designate but not as a District Judge ora Civil Court. Hence I have no hesitation to hold that such a Tribunal, though manned by a judicial officer having the statute of a District Judge, does not possess any inherent powers analogous to those vested in a Civil Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The procedure that governs the inquiries by the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings functioning under a Special statute or any other special tribunal must be specifically provided either by the Special enactment under which the very tribunal has been created or the rules made thereunder. The Code of Civil Procedure or Criminal Procedure Code has no general application for inquiries to be conducted by the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings or any other special tribunal unless the special statute or the rules made thereunder specifically provide for the same. This view derives support from the very fact that the legislature intended to make the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code applicable only with regard to the matters specified in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Sub-section (1) to Section 5 of the Act. The contention of the Government Pleader that the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings is competent to order joint trial or two or mote charged officers as there is no specific prohibition or bar either under the Act or the rules made thereunder to conduct jointtrial, cannot be accepted. If the submission of the Government Pleader is given effect to, it will create hardship and uncertainity relating to procedure and lead to anomalies resulting in miscarriage of justice. The jurisdiction of a Tribunal relating to the procedure to be adopted by it for inquiries before it cannot be inferred by the absence of any specific prohibition or bar either in the Act or the Rules made thereunder Nor can jurisdiction be conferred on any tribunal by consent of the parties. Every citizen has a basic right to insist upon separate trial in respect of any charge made against him. That right cannot be taken away or interfered with except by authority of law. Where Ihe accused bonafide entertains a reasonable apprehension that he may not have fair and just trial and he will not be in a position to set up independent and full defence if joint trial is ordered, it is always safe, proper just and desirable to have a separate and independent trial of each accused without clubbing his case with that of another. Where justice requires separate and independent trial, the tribunal or any court should not be obsessed with the time factor. The liberty and vindication of the fundamental or any other legal rights of a citizen is of prime importance for the tribunal or court. The Courts as well as the tribunals whether quasi- jndicial or administrative in character, must not only do justice but appear to do justice for all practical purposes as the only object of the inquiries by all the tribunals is only to arrive at correct, and proper decisions on the point at issue.